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ABSTRACT
This study is about the current operation of the Greek Public 
Administratioon (G.P.A.) and the effects of political interference in this operation.
It examines how political involvement affects bureaucratic procedures and how 
reinforces dysfunctions which are generated by the nature of bureaucracy itself.
The study analyses several aspects of the bureaucratic process such as 
selection, promotion, or allocation of employees in relation to both bureaucracy and 
politics. In so doing, it draws on sociological theories of bureaucracy and 
empirical data collected from public services within the G.P.A. Historical factors 
and cultural traits are also considered as variables which contribute to the 
configuration of the workplace culture.
The research findings indicate that the nature of political influence on 
public administration in Greece is detrimental to its operation; at the same time 
it increases ones analytical ambivalence about the identification of bureaucracy 
with efficiency. Furthermore these politics seem to enhance bureaucratic control 
while bureaucracy through its structure allows an increase of politicization of the 
G.P.A. The consequence of this double-edged relation is an extensive inefficiency 
and ineffectiveness of the G.P.A. which in turn has detrimental effects on the 
socio-economic status of the state.
It is evident that it, the G.P.A., is to be reformed it needs to be transformed 
on the basis of more humanisation and less Politcization. However, one is 
ambivalent as to whether or not political forces will cease to be involved in the
bureaucratie process of the G.P.A. and whether or not it is feasible that the Greek 
bureaucracy can adopt humanistic principles. That is because political power 
draws sustenance from the control procedures that the bureaucracy facilitates.
This bureaucracy, in turn, has until now not seemed willing to leam  from 
its own errors. The impasse, dysfunctionality and administrative malaise seem 
unbreakable under the present political coi\juncture.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims and Objectives
Historically, the ancient civilization of Greece has greatly affected 
the cultures of the European nations and the values of liberty and of 
democracy. In recent history, Greece was engaged in the struggles 
against fascism, manifesting once again its adherence to these values. 
More recently still, in 1980 , Greece embraced the idea of the united 
Europe by becoming a member of the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Greece, thereby, declared its determination to co-operate with the 
other European countries in order to enhance the well being of its 
citizens and to promote the values of liberty and democracy. In so doing, 
Greece became accountable, not only to its citizens, but also to its 
European counterparts.
This great accountability has resulted in a general reappraisal of 
Greek policy within the country. In the face of these increased external 
demands, a detailed examination of the State superstructure has been 
undertaken during the 1980s. This thorough review has revealed major 
organisational problems in Greek Public Administration (GPA).
This thesis is concerned to examine the contemporary operation of 
the G.P.A. It does so by drawing on sociological theories of bureaucracy 
and empirical research in three public sectors related organisations in 
Greece. The G.P.A. like public sector organisations in many other
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countries, has recently been under attack from various commentators 
because of perceived inefficiencies within its internal systems. Against 
this background, the following thesis seeks to identify the extent to which 
these criticisms are valid and the underlying reasons for the problems 
facing the G.P.A.
The last ten years, in particular, has seen a growing concern
expressed by Greek politicians, academics and the press about the
apparent inefficiencies of the G.P.A. In addition to diagnosing the
problems, they have tried to find the reasons for the malaise of the of the
G.P.A. and have sometimes proposed possible remedies. In order to
demonstrate the various dimensions of the problem, as defined by
commentators I will cite some extracts from the hundreds of reports
which appear in scholarly magazines and the daily press:
"We will not be surprised if the officials of the Common 
Market, who are studying the country's administrative 
system, because so desperate that they will suggest the 
complete abolition of the existing administrative system  
and the establishment of a new one." (15.4.1976, 
newspaper '^Acropolis") "Greeks do not seem to understand 
that each change in the country affects and is reflected by 
Public Administration whi#i becomes our primary 
problems . "(A Kanelopoulos, politician, academic, 1906- 
1976 in newspaper "To Vima").
"Our Public Administration is the poorest in Western 
Europe; it is over-populated, under-productive, 
immobilized, unspecialized, lazy and inimical to team­
work, anti-social, irresponsible and prone to illiberal 
measures. It is unable to take us either into Europe or to 
modernisation and progress..."(3.10.1977, newspaper 
Eleftherotypia").
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"Now the time has come when Greece must go through its 
social and economic revolution, which will include radical 
measures and full restructuring in Public Administration. 
"(G. Abbott, President of the Greek Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, in the Magazine 'Economicos Tahidromos' 
issue of 7-9. 1978).
"Our country is at high level of socio-economic 
development, but its administration has not followed this 
evolution. From the point of view of institutions and 
methodology, it is, therefore, necessary to adjust as soon as 
possible, our administrative mechanism, "(interview of K. 
Mitsotakis, Minister of Coordination in newspaper 
''ApogevmatinV' issue of 5.5. 1979).
"Generally the Greek Public Sector is distinguished for its 
intensive ineffectiveness, anachronisms, superficiality, lack 
of effective educational programms, non-meritocracy, 
supremacy of mediocracy, ptethora of and unequal 
distribution of staff, poor time-keeping and absenteeism, 
diffusion of responsibility, inadequate control, inequalities 
in payment. "(Dr. Th. Katsanevas, member of the 
executive office of the Socialist party (HAZOK) in the
'Administrative Reformation'* Magazine, 1980, issue I).
"...it would not be the first time that the over-crowded 
G.P.A. and its bureaucracy were lamented..."(18.6.1989 
newspaper To Vima")
"23 December 1981: the government has to consider the 
administrative problem of the country... where two of its 
well-known pathological symptoms are "bureaucracy" on 
the one hand and 'rouspheti* from the Bavarian era... on 
the other ."
21 June 1985: the open wound of Public Administration is 
the bueaucracy..." (Ch. Babilis, 4.2.1990 in the newspaper 
"Kathimerini")
The foregoing quotations and literally hundreds of others, which are 
impossible to include in this work, demonstrate the degree of consensus 
that exists concerning the problems in the G.P.A. They also indicate the 
apparent intractability and the persistence of these problems of
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inefficiency. Furthermore in the last few quotations, inefficiency in the 
G.P.A. is attributed to 'bureaucracy' and to 'rouspheti* * Equally the 
final quotation, seems to treat 'bureaucracy' and 'rouspheti* as two 
independent factors equally responsible for G.P.A.'s inefficiency. Yet, as 
I will elaborate later, 'rouspheti* and bureaucracy are by definition two 
contradictory terms inasmuch as the former implies personal and 
political interference in the administrative process, while the latter 
implies impersonality.
Also the term bureaucracy, which is repeatedly mentioned in the 
quotations of critics of the G.P.A. contains a great deal of negative and 
pejorative meaning such as 'red tape* and delay in procedures. The 
pejorative meanings of bureaucracy, as M. Albrow (1970) points out must 
be sought in the nineteenth-century writing on bureaucracy. In the 
studies of Von Mohl, Olszewski and Le Play bureaucracy is presented as 
the popular discontent with government while seeing the essence of 
bureaucracy in officiousness of the paid officials.
* The term 'rouspheti* has been adopted by the Greek glossary, taken 
from the Arabic though Turkish and implies favouritism, repotism, 
partial treatment. It is particularly linked with the G.P.A. inasmuch as 
it seems to underpin most of the administrative procedures, and to allow 
the intervention of political parties in the various aspects of the operation 
of the G.P.A.
—
This concept of bureaucracy in the nineteenth-century along with 
two others, namely a) bureaucracy as a form of government (Gk)umay, 
Mill) and b) bureaucracy as an administrative form lead to the 
conceptual paradoxes of twentieth-century where bureaucracy appears 
both as administrative efficiency and administrative inefficiency. 
Weber’s ideal-type identifies bureaucracy with efficiency because it 
provides speed in procedures, precision and standardization. 
Furthermore, ideal bureaucracy does not seem to be fertile ground for 
'rouspheti* because the former is based on impersonality while the latter 
is not.
What happens then in the G.P.A.? Is the G.P.A. inefficient 
because it applies bureaucracy in the way that it was defined by Weber, 
or is it the case that the G.P.A. departs from the ideal bureaucratic type? 
What is the role of 'rouspheti'?
The aim of this study, therefore, is to respond to these questions, 
by examining the key issues of bureaucracy and 'rouspheti' in the G.P.A.. 
This objective is pursued through exploration of the historical 
development of the G.P.A. combined with an examination of major issues 
such as managerial control, and the organisational structure and the 
culture of the G.P.A.
The inefficiency in the G.P.A. is neither a new nor unexplored 
question. There are quite a number of studies and recent bibliography 
(Athanasopoulos 1983, Tsoukalas 1986, Mouzelis 1978, Pagakis lB8&etc) 
concerned with this issue. I cite two recent studies: the study of
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'Administration and Democracy -  The administrative problem of Greece 
and its resolution ' by M. Mathioudakis and V. Andronopoulos (1980) 
published in the magazine 'Administrative Reformation' and the study 
entitled 'Culture Cap in Greek Management' by D. Bourantas, J. 
Anagnostelis, Y. Mantes, A. Kefalas (1990) published in Organisation 
Studies However, while these studies deal with similar issues to the 
present study, they focus on different perspectives. Thus, the first study 
deals with strategic remedies of the G.P.A. while the second study 
considers management in enterprises and organisations in the Greek 
private sector.
The study begins by emphasizing the importance of Public 
Administration in the operation of the modem state and the maintenance 
of democracy. It then focuses on the structure of the G.P.A. and 
examines it in relation to the socio-economic changes which have taken 
place in the State. The authors argue that the G.P.A. has delayed those 
changes and hence they suggest that the G.P.A. must be transformed 
because of the benefits that will accrue
Then they consider the whole question of the G.P.A. from a 
practical perspective, proposing strategies that will change its structure 
and solve the problems of inefficiency contained therein. These 
recommendations are the administrative experience of the writers. 
According to them, their aim is to give applicable solutions to the 
problems of the G.P.A. and not to enrich, the already considerable
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literature about public administration by adding yet more theoretical 
material.
By contrast, this study is concerned to contribute to an 
understanding of the current operation of the G.P.A. Indeed, I would 
argue that theoretical and empirical analysis of the G.P.A. is an essential 
precondition for the implementation of effective strategies of intervention. 
The present study is also distinctive in the following ways. Firstly, it 
examines inefficiency in relation to bureaucracy, taking the latter to be 
an organisational structure. (Weberian view) and not as a factor which 
leads inevitably to inefficiency. Secondly, in the same context, in other 
words in relation to bureaucracy, 'rouspetV and party political 
involvement are considered. Thirdly, this study is supported by 
empirical evidence from interviews with public servants and trade 
unionists.
Having outlined the aims, objectives and context of the thesis, I 
will now turn to an elaboration of the methodology used in data collection 
in the G.P.A.
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1.2. Mfilhodology
To collect my data I conducted research at the Ministry of 
Education and Religion, the central service and the regional service. 
This particular Ministry was chosen because access would be easier and 
protracted negotiations would be avoided. This was because I had 
worked for this particular Ministry for fifteen years. Indeed it was as 
a result of this employment that I had been stimulated to conduct this 
study. I considered this area to be a challenging one and I wanted to 
verify my aims in relation to employees who had also been experienced 
in the same area of the G.P.A.
From my experience as an employee in the G.P.A. I would say that 
there are no particular differences in the way that other Ministries 
operate or in the way that the personnel of those Ministries perceive the 
issues under consideration. Therefore, I had no reason to believe that 
my sample was not a typical part of the G.P.A. as a whole.
The choice of methodology was directed by the past success of 
qualitative methods in the organisation studies field (e.g.: CoUinson 1981, 
1988a; Knights and CoUinson 1985, 1987). People were interviewed in 
a flexible way, requiring the interviewer to practice delicate handling, 
patience and humour while gathering important information for the 
study. The choice of this methodology was shaped by the sort of issue 
that the research sought to explore -  i.e, informal practices, subjective 
experience, workplace culture and the "social" relations of bureaucratic
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organisation. A static and inflexible questionnaire survey would not 
have adequately explored such questions, to the extent that such 
methods predetermine and circumscribe the type of responses which they 
secure. To explore workplace relations, experience, culture and practices 
and more flexible, less formal and more open-ended methodology was 
required. Hence, my methods were shaped by the theories and the 
questions with which I began my research.
This qualitative approach was, however, not wholly unstructured.
It was based on a questionnaire which highlighted some of the key 
issues. Yet, beyond this framework according to the flow of the 
discussion. That gave me the flexibility to reach my aim by various 
means. Also, the interviewees were not interrupted in order to be asked 
certain questions at certain points, thus, they could integrate their 
thoughts and their talk which sometimes led to important issues being 
raised that I had not previously considered. Furthermore, direct 
contrast with the interviewee and the flexibility of the questionnaire 
generated a friendly atmosphere rather than a formally deliberate and 
constrained discussion. This climate was comfortable for both the 
interviewee and the interviewer and allowed some hidden feelings to be 
revealed such as suspicion of the purpose of the interview or a kind of 
fear about what had been said during the discussion. Indeed the 
defensiveness of interviewees was a recurrent and unanticipated finding 
that emerged in conducting the research. This is illustrated by the 
following examples.
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A manager of a service did not object to me interviewing his 
subordinates, but he insisted that he be the first interviewee. His 
interests in my work and his insistence that he should be first to be 
interviewed reflected his suspicion about "what all this work was about" 
and how "dangerous" it could be for the reputationcf the service. This 
feeling which emerged from the contact we had before the interview 
fortunately had turned into ’approval' at the end of the interview. The 
whole process of the interview and the fact that I promised 
confidentiality, established trust.
Also, most of the interviewees asked me to provide a general 
review of my questionnaire before they would consent to being 
interviewed. It gave me the idea that they were suspicious about "what 
was going on".
Another interviewee revealed her defensiveness by asking to take 
the tape that we had used for the interview, with her to play it in the 
afternoon. She would like, she said, to listen to her voice and to check 
how correctly she had spoken in front of a tape recorder. I suspect that 
this was an excuse for her to take the tape and be sure that whatever 
she said could not cause smy damage to her if the interview were to be 
used for other reasons.
Some of the other respondents, after we had finished the interview, 
asked me to play back the tape to "listen to their voices". I think their 
rationalization showed the same reason as the previous interviewee who 
had asked to take the tape with her; in other words it was a matter of
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defensiveness. What did emerge during the research was that lower 
level employees were less anxious about their responses than those in the 
higher level positions. This extensive degree of defensiveness merely in 
conducting the research was an important indicator of problems within 
the social relations of the G.P.A. Again this finding was unlikely to have 
emerged using the more formal methods of questionnaire systems.
Some interviewees tried to take advantage of the friendly 
atmosphere to ask me to play the tapes of interviews with their 
superiors, but they were always told that interviews were confidential.
On the one hand they were disappointed not to be informed of their 
superiors’ more personal thoughts; on the other hand they felt more 
comfortable when they responded because confidentiality had been shown 
to be implemented.
Unlike the employees who pretended that their work was 
important and so pressing that they really could not be interviewed, 
there were others who asked desperately to discuss things with me. It 
is worth noting that an employee of the lowest hierarchical level wanted 
to be interviewed thinking that I was going to publish my information, 
a he stated: "I would like to tell you everything about how the superiors 
order us to do this and that and they are not concerned about our 
working conditions." He elaborated some of the problems their 
administrative class had, such as securing a room to work in. Then he
ended up: " there is no sympathy or interest for the lowest-grade
employees. You must be powerful to be heard " He obviously
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believed that through a research interview with me he could be heard 
and perhaps find a solution to his persistent problems. Some saw me 
as an opportunity to give Voice’ to their anxieties.
Sometimes employees left their posts to be interviewed considering 
that to be more important than to serve the clients for a while. They 
believed that the only way for the public administration to change was 
for more researchers to conduct studies and especially researchers from 
the body of the G.P.A. itself. Those examples serve to illustrate the 
sense of powerlessness often experienced by employees in the G.P.A.
However, despite many employees’ obvious willingness to help my 
project and despite the friendly atmosphere, I could still feel that they 
hesitated to provide a completely accurate account of events. To my 
question: "what frightened them?" the answer given fi*om most of them  
was identical. They highlighted the way that some superiors and peers 
would not tolerate the truth about the adminstration of the service 
although they knew it. They were content to entertain the idea that the 
adminstration was satisfactory. Therefore, any contrary opinion would 
challenge the taken-for-granted status quo and would create problems 
for those who expressed such an idea. Hence, defensiveness, in other 
words, again underlies the employees’ hesitation to respond.
Another difficulty was the one about the party political 
interference in the administrative operation of the service. Although, 
most of the employees had little difficulty in speaking about informal 
groups sharing the same political convictions which influenced the
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administrative fiinctions, they refused to acknowledge that Political 
ideology influences general organisational behaviour. Nevertheless, 
most of them admitted that their friendships in the workplace started 
with colleagues of the same Political convictions. The way by which I 
found intervewees, also confirms the fact that relationships are mostly 
dependent on party-political affiliations.
From the discussion I had with an interviewee, she believed that 
I shared her political ideas. Thus, she introduced me to other colleagues 
who supported the same political party encouraging them to help me as 
being one of "their's".
Then I was to sent another colleague who supported the opposite 
political party. I soon realised that the idea was, on the one hand, to 
secure information from an "opposition" and on the other hand, to put 
her in the difficult situation of being interviewed during a pre-election 
period when the general situation in the G.P.A. was very tense. The 
reaction of this interviewee really shocked me and reinforced the idea 
that party-political affiliations were detrimental to the G.P.A. operation. 
This interviewee expressed considerable defensiveness. She refused to 
utter a single word especially when I told her that I was intending to use 
a tape-recorder. Her fear was obvious. To my question: "why are you 
so frightened?" she answered that she did not want to move to another 
place or to another service because of this interview. She preferred to 
keep her own opinion to herself and nobody else, and that because, as
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she said, the Political involvement in the administration is not only 
strong but, also, extremely harmful for officials with other ideological 
views.
Another technique I used to conduct interviewees was through 
acquaintances regardless of party-political convictions. Therefore, I 
gathered valuable information from an experienced manager and his 
subordinates to whom he introduced me, encouraging them to give me 
any help.
My last interviewees were some trade unionists from the central 
committee of the public servants trade union, who happily collaborated, 
giving me a lot of their spare time.
For convenience all interviews were tape-recorded. Using the 
tape recorder was sometimes the reason why employees revealed their 
fear about their responses being published. Indeed, there were three 
cases where employees would not allow me to use the machine nor to 
keep notes.
The semi-structured questionnaire used for the purpose of this 
study included questions about employees' personal details, 
organisational structure, environment, work conditions, relationships 
among employees, equal opportunities, political interference. The 
quotations which are used in this study are chosen as those which 
represent the widely held views of employees.
—1 4 —
Among the forty (40) interviewees there were:
1 ex-top manager (Secretary ’'Specialist”)
3 managers
5 supervisors 
24 clerical staff of various grades
4 educational staff burden with administrative 
responsibilities.
3 trade unionists 
Before finishing with the reference to the methodology, I would 
like to add that the fact that I worked for the G.P.A. for years, was, 
overall great advantage for me as a researcher. I was familiar with the 
practices, the procedures and the culture of the workplace. However, 
there were a few cases where it seemed to be less of an advantage. As 
I worked for the same Ministry, where the project was developing, it 
might have been a constraint for some employees to give me honest 
opinions. In addition to those interviews, my methodology drew on the 
analysis of various organisational documents and on careful consideration 
of the relevant public sector magazines, journals and other publication.
To summarise, the research methodology itself highlighted 
extensive interviewee defensiveness and suspicion. This defensiveness 
reflects the political nature of the G.P.A. and begins to illustrate, albeit 
in an indirect way, the source of the organisational problems of the 
G.P.A. which have been highlighted consistently by Greek commentators,
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such as those who were discussed earlier. The analysis of the data 
collected through this methodology will be presented in chapters three, 
four and five. The names of the interviewees are false names, given by 
me in order to secure the confidentiality I had promised. Having 
described the aims and background context of the thesis and the 
methodological processes involved in conducting the research, the final 
section of this introduction now outhnes the overall structure of the 
subsequent chapters of the thesis.
Footnote: I will use capital P for "politics" or "political when using the
words in terms of policy, politics of government or political 
parties.
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1.3 S tructure of th e  Study
The fîrst chap ter  considers Weber’s contribution to our 
understanding of bureaucracy as the most adequate organisational 
structure applied in any kind of organisation from the military and 
churches to firms and States, It is especially introduced into big and 
complex organisation as it provides discipline and compliance through 
rationalization of the institutions, hierarchical structuring of authority 
and the creation of a chain of command, which in turn is seen to lead to 
efficiency.
The main element in bureaucratic theory is 'impersonality' which 
underlies every action and which prevents nepotisim, favouritism and 
individual involvement in organisational procedures. Impersonality is 
mainly to be achieved through 'orders’. Impersonality also assures 
equality of treatment for all employees; regardless of the hierarchical 
level that they hold, they are subject to the same established rules and 
orders.
How eniployees in the G.P.A. treat bureaucracy and how 
bureaucracy is implemented in the G.P.A. will be considered in the 
secon d  chapter. This chapter will seek to question whether 
bureaucracy in the G.P.A. is a term which better expresses the 
dysfunctions of bureaucracy than defines the term itself. In other words 
this chapter will apply the theories of Weber to the understanding of the 
G.P.A. In addition, it will also include a reference to the historical
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development of the G.P.A. How and under what circumstances was the 
G.P.A. established? What factors have affected its evolution? Which of 
these factors have remained dominant from its establishment up until 
the present day giving at the same time, the answer to the question "why 
is the G.P.A. inefficient?"; does historical development confirm that party 
political involvement is defined as departing from Weberian 
bureaucracy?: all these will be stages of this excursion into the history 
of the G.P.A.
The following three chapters draw on empirical data. The th ird  
chapter examines 'rousphetV and demonstrates that it is interrelated 
with bureaucratic organisation in the G.P.A. This analysis will highlight 
the degree to which bureaucratic principles are affected by political 
involvement. By analyzing each one of the bureaucratic characteristics 
in relation to party political involvement, we will follow step by step their 
entire transformation from formal functions into powerful tools in the 
hands of the party in power and the Government which represents it. 
More than any other, this chapter reveals the way that ideal bureaucracy 
does not actually exist in the G.P.A.
The fourth  chap ter  deals with the important function of 
managerial control in the operation of the organisation. It examines the 
way that managerial control is exercised and the relationship between 
control and bureaucratic organisations. The chapter also considers the 
extent to which managerial control is affected by political involvement 
and if it is, what the consequences are.
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The response of employees to bureaucratic control is also 
highlighted in this chapter. Do employees resist? How do they express 
their resistance to inadequate managerial control? To these questions 
answers will be given through the responses of interviewees. The role of 
Public Sector Trade Unionism is also considered here as a potential 
source for collective resistance to inadequate management. Public 
servants’ trade unionism is examined in the context of the social 
organisational environment and whether it is affected or not by Political 
involvement.
Finally, the fifth  chapter discusses the empirical evidence which 
reinforces the view of the detrimental influence of 'rousphetV and party 
political involvement in the organisational culture of the G.P.A. It, also, 
examines the degree to which organisational culture is affected by the 
wider social culture, in which political affiliations tend to become the 
basic form of relationships. Furthermore, organisational culture is 
considered as a factor which contributes to the distortion of the ideal 
bureaucratic structure and allows inefficiency to grow. This chapter 
draws in particular on the work of Crozier and his study of bureaucracy 
in the context of French society.
The findings of this research are listed in the conclusion of the 
thesis. In the conclusion are, also included some suggestions in the case 
of a decision by the Political masters to transform the G.P.A.
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CHAPTER I: Bureaucracy
1.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a theoretical exploration of the notion of 
bureaucracy drawing in particular on the work of Max Weber. The 
discussion is then broadened to include other theorists of bureaucracy 
before criticism of these theories is reviewed.
Overall, the chapter seeks to identify the relationship between 
bureaucracy and power, bureaucracy and Politics, bureaucracy and 
employees as well as bureaucracy and clients. This examination thereby 
seeks to introduce the theoretical context in which this study was 
developed.
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1.2 What is bureaucracy?
A great deal of our experience of modem society as Clegg (1990) 
argues is based on organisations. "Without a plurality of complex 
organisations there would be no possibilities of civility and citizenship, 
because it is only through organisational representation that the majority 
of people can achieve any form of interest articulation in a large scale, 
modem and mass society. Unions, parties, councils ... are the means 
through which we participate in modemity... Public life is organisational 
life for most people." (Clegg 1990, p.5) In order to function most 
organisations are structured along bureaucratic principles.
Academics have studied bureaucracy from a number of different 
social science disciplines such as sociology, economics and politics. 
However the main stimulus and seminal work for the study of 
bureaucracy comes from the German sociologist Max Weber who locates 
bureaucracy in the context of economic systems. Bureaucracy according 
to him can be developed in any economic system as it does not make any 
difference whether the economic system is organised on a capitalist or a 
socialist basis, (p.337) However, he emphasizes that because of "its 
specific nature" bureaucracy is welcome by capitalism" (Weber 1948, p. 
215). To this extent he delimits the context within which bureaucracy 
has developed.
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The word bureaucracy as Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) report, is 
ascribed to the Frenchman de Cour na y (1712-1759) who in the term 
"bureau", meaning writing-table and office, added the Greek suffix for 
"rule", in order to define bureaucracy as the rule of officials. This suffix, 
"cracy", which derives from the Greek "Kratia", gives bureaucracy its 
nature of power. The pejorative connotations of the word are, also, 
ascribed to a Frenchman. He is the novelist Honore de Balzac who used 
the term negatively in his novel "Les Employe’s" (1836) (Martin Albow 
1970).
Whatever is the derivation of the word, it is to Weber one most 
first refer when considering the development of the concept. It is Weber's 
rational theory whose basic tenets are accepted by all major schools of 
organisation theory, such as the classical, human relation and humanist.
Bureaucracy for Weber is a mode of organisation, which requires 
an administrative staff and a leader. The basic characteristics for an 
organisation to be classified as bureaucratic are:
"1. (officials) are personally free and subject to authority only with 
respect to their impersonal official obligations.
2. They are organised in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
3. Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal 
sense.
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4. The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in 
principle, there is free selection.
5. Candidates are selected on the basis of technical 
qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination 
of guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They 
are appointed, not elected.
6. They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part 
with a right to pensions... The salary scale is primarily graded according 
to rank in the hierarchy; but in addition to this criterion, the 
responsibility of the position and the requirements of the incumbent's 
social status way to he taken into account.
7. The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupations 
of the incumbent.
8. It constitutes a career. There is a system of 'promotion’ according to 
seniority or to achievement, or both Promotion is dependent on the 
judgement of superiors.
9. The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of 
administration and without appropriation of his position.
10. He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the 
conduct of the office". (D. S. Pugh 1984, p. 20-21)
In Weber's theory there are three predominant elements which 
characterize bureaucracy namely rationality, rules and impersonality.
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Each of these notions are a precondition for organisational efficiency, 
which is the primary objective of the bureaucratic organisational 
structure. I will now discuss each of these key bureaucratic elements in 
turn.
"By ration a lity  Weber seems to mean that kind of action or mode 
of organizing in which goals are clearly conceived and all conduct except 
that designed to achieve the particular goal is eliminated." State Francis 
and Stone (1956, in M Albrow 1970, p.62) while N. Mouzelis (1967, p.51) 
remarks that "In the Weberian sense, rationality implies the 
appropriateness of means to ends. In the bureaucratic context this 
means efficiency."
However, Morgan (1986) believes that rationality for Weber is the 
logic driving modem societies. It is also the response to "demands" of the 
modem cultures. (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). "The peculiarity of 
modem culture, and specifically of its technical and economic basis, 
demands this very "culculabüity" of results. ...Today it is primarily the 
capitalist market economy which demands the official business of the 
administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and 
with as much speed as possible." Says Weber (in Clegg and Dunkerley 
1980 p.80).
Therefore, rationality is a unique characteristic of Western 
civilization which is "distinguished from every other by the presence of
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a man with a rational ethic for the conduct of life." (Weber in Clegg and 
Dunkerley 1980 p. 34) It is, also, related to the free capitalist market. 
Because of that all the values gradually became more materialistic. 
Labour is no longer measured in terms of social and honorific value but 
in terms of a means which contributes to a profitable enterprise. Then 
follows the rationality of "ends", whose achievement requires rational 
technology. It, in turn, entails a progressive extension of the division of 
labour and specialisation. The next step in this process is the rational 
management which is required in order for efficiency to be gained and 
the goal set to be attained.
This rational management becomes an increasingly dominating 
process through "rules" and it makes people "engage in strict calculations 
relating means and ends and costs and benefits.... Impersonal principles 
and the quest for efficiency tend to become our new slave drivers." 
(Morgan 1986 p.278) Thus, "for Weber the process of rationalisation is 
itself a mode of domination." (Morgan 1986, p. 278).
In pursuit of efficiency, these processes of rationality must be 
accepted by or imposed on the members of the organisation. Within a 
bureaucracy, as has been mentioned, this is best achieved through the 
creation of a set of rules.
The rules lay down the hierarchy of offices in the bureaucracy and 
specify the rights and the duties of each official. These "consciously
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made rational rules (which may be agreed upon or imposed from above)" 
have to "meet with obedience as generally binding norms whenever such 
obedience is claimed by him whom the rule designates. In that case 
every single bearer of power of command is legitimated by the system of 
rational norms and his power is legitimate insofar as it corresponds with 
the norm. Obedience is thus given to the norms rather than to the 
person." (Weber in J. Miner 1982, p.388)
The administrative staff have to regulate behaviour by these rules. 
As constituting a ruling body they also have to check the adherence of 
the other members to the rules of the organisation. "Members of the 
organisation tend to obey these rules because of their belief that they are 
subject to an "order governing the organisation " which was regarded by 
Weber as a "structure of dominancy" (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980,p.77).
The "order of governing" is based on three different types of 
authority: the charismatic, the traditional and the rational -  legal. 
Obedience to charismatic authority is premised upon the sacred or 
extraordinary characteristics of the person giving the order. Traditional 
authority bases its pourer on the notion of lineage or primogeniture -  i.e. 
authority is inherited. The third and most powerful form of authority 
generates obedience because of people's "belief that the person giving the 
order was acting in accordance with the duties stipulated in a code of 
legal rules and regulations." (Clegg 1990 p.35)
—2 6 —
As Clegg (1990) points out (following Albmw 1970), the latter form 
of obedience depends on five beliefs:
"1. that a legal code can be established which can claim obedience 
form members of the organisation;
2. that the law is a system of abstract rules; these rules are 
applied to particular cases, and the administration looks after the 
interests of the organisation within the limits of the law;
3. that the man exercizing authority also obeys this impersonal
order;
4. that only qua member does the member obey the law;
5. that obedience is due not to the person who holds authority but 
to the impersonal order which has granted his/her this position." (p.35).
The implementation of rational principles through explicit rules 
and regulations is contingent upon the third primary characteristic of 
bureaucracy namely impersonality. Bureaucracy is impersonal as 
administrators who are loyal to the system, not to individuals, or family 
or clan, practice their rationally validated skills regardless of context. 
"Everyone is subject to formal equality of treatment, says Weber. This 
is the spirit in which the ideal official conducts his business." (D. 
Buchanan and A. Huczynski 1985, p. 319) Rules are the means which 
serve and secure impersonality.
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What does bureaucracy aim to achieve through rationalization, 
explicit rules and impersonality? Efficiency, is the answer and that is, 
at the same time, the key which unlocks the doors of modem society to 
bureaucracy. Weber himself declares: "Experience tends universally to 
show that the purely bureaucratic type of organisation... is from a purely 
technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of 
efficiency ..." Later he repeats: "It is finally superior both in intensive 
efficiency and in the scope of its operation and is formaly capable of 
application to all kinds of administrative tasks." (Weber 1947).
Thus according to Weber, bureaucracy is indispensable in modern 
society and in administration. Especially in the latter "the choice is only 
between bureaucracy and dilettantism". ...it would be sheer illusion to 
think for a moment that continuous administrative work can be carried 
out in any field except by means of officials working in offices." (D. Pugh 
1984, p.24) Weber concludes that once a system of bureaucracy is 
established it is almost impossible to stop. "The decisive reason for the 
advance of bureaucratic organisation has always been its purely technical 
superiority over any other form of machine." (Weber 1948, p.214).
Bennis (1973) supports Weber’s statement by arguing that the sun 
will never set on bureaucracies and that bureaucracy is inevitable and 
therefore necessary for governing large and complex organisations.
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Furthermore, F. Heffron (1989) points out that "bureaucratic 
organisations are structured to maximize specialization and efficiency..." 
(p. 182) while for R Kreitner (1986, p.245) "Weber’s bureaucracy, in 
theory was supposedly the epitome of efficiency.
However, Charles Perrow treats bureaucracy as a moral project 
seeking thereby bureaucracy not only as efficient but also something 
desirable (Clegg 1990). C. Perrow (1986) claims that the morality of 
bureaucracy is embedded in the fact that it is against any kind of 
discrimination such as ethnicity, gender, age or religion. Bureaucracy 
promises equal treatment for the members of the organisation according 
solely to their official status, regardless of other aspects of their identity. 
As Clegg (1990) points out, the conception of bureaucracy as a moral 
project, such as Perrow advances it "is a Liberal conception in all the very 
best sources of the term." It is such, because it insists that "one should 
be treated solely in terms of the rights, responsibilities, rules and duties 
appropriate to one’s position as a member of the organisation. Whether 
one is black or white, red or green male or female, straight or gay, should 
be irrelevant." (p.5)
However Weber writes about bureaucracy in a sceptical way. In 
his later work, Weber regards the tendency to bureaucratization with a 
sort of "despair" and he did not hesitate to state that "it is horrible to 
think that the world could one day be filled with little cogs, little men
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clinging to little jobs and striving towards bigger ones ... this passion for 
bureaucracy is enough to drive one to despair.” (Weber, in Clegg 1990, 
p. 30) This cry of despair constitutes the strongest criticism of 
bureaucracy, particularly since it comes from Weber himself. This is, 
also, one of a number of criticisms that bureaucracy has borne. A 
reference to those criticisms appears in the next section.
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1.3. Critiques on Weber and Bureaucracy
Certain writers have adopted a more critical approach to 
bureaucratic organisation. For example Marx argued that bureaucracy 
was the apparatus formed and utilized by the ruling class in order to 
serve its own interests and to validate its domination. Within a society 
which is characterized by the existence of several social classes and 
which is based on exploitation bureaucracy is a primary means of 
coercion. For him, therefore, bureaucracy does not serve the general 
interest. The general interest is rather limited to the particular interest 
of bureaucracy which requires the perpetuation of spheres of interests of 
the unions and of social classes in order to present itself as an artificial 
generality. "Bureaucracy is condemned to deal with everything and to 
present an endless activity in order to cover the absence of real work." 
(C. Lefort, 1985)
In this respect bureaucracy is characterised in terms of the 
superiority of ritualism over the substance and the tendency of the 
organisation to become an end in itself and not an apparatus through 
which the goals set will be achieved. Thus, Marx assumes, that 
bureaucracy is a temporary phenomenon which will be eliminated along 
with the domination of capitalism, despite Weber's view that "socialism 
requires a higher degree of bureaucratization than capitalism" (Weber 
1947 p.33)
However, Trotsky supporting Marx's view, believes that
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bureaucracy "is a stratum or caste, parasitic upon socialist society" (M. 
Albrow 1970, p. 16); is a temporary practical formation connected with a 
particular historical chance; is a fungus which is matured on the social 
body and which will be disassociated by a coming revolution. (C. Leffort, 
1985)
Lenin insists that bureaucracy separates the mass from the state 
and makes mass participation impossible through the following 
characteristics:
"1. appointment of ofïîcials who are neither elected nor have
the responsibility of recall.
2. the high salaries and special privileges of officials, which 
concretely tie their interests to the bourgeoisie create an 
aura of "official grandeur" around them and place them 
"above the people" and
3. the restricted quality of bourgeois democracy, which 
separates legislation from administrative activity and 
prevents the activity of people in either ....
Thus bureaucracy which is connected with the bourgeoisie, would 
be unfit to carry out the orders of the proletarian state." (Er O. Wright 
1978, p.200)
For Robert Michels bureaucracy is not only the means of coercion, 
as Marx believes, but the coercion itself. Bureaucracy, according to him, 
is a system of imposition of a numerically small class over the majority
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of human beings. "Who says organisation, say oligarchy" states Michels 
(in M. Albrow 1970, p.36)
Yet, for Claude Lefort (1985) bureaucracy is considered as a 
grouping of people who tend to impose a concrete organisational form on 
society. His views seem to approach those of R Michels about the law of 
oligarchy. He links bureaucracy with power through the authoritative 
status of the bureaucrats who, according to him, desire to form an 
isolated group, which keeps its distance from the ruled. G. Leford 
measures the degree of bureaucratization by the volume of the paper 
which is used in every day performance of an organisation.
All the preceding bureaucratic views seem to consider bureaucracy 
in terms of power, and control. However, there are numerous others 
which focus their criticism on fundamental bureaucratic values such as 
rationality, rules and impersonality and they face them critically in 
relation to efficiency.
R. Merton (1940) is one of those theorists who question the idea of 
rational bureaucracy. He believes that a rational structure in terms of 
Weber, "can easily generate consequences which are unexpected and 
detrimental to the attainment of an organization's objectives. Thus 
emphasis on precision and reliability in administration may well have 
self-defeating consequences. Rules, designed as means to ends, may well 
become ends in themselves. The graded career structure of the 
bureaucrat may encourage him to an excess of the virtue he is supposed 
to embody: prudence, discipline, method. Governed by similar work
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conditions officials develop a group solidarity which may result in 
opposition to necessary change. Where officials are supposed to serve the 
public the very norms of impersonality which govern their behaviour may 
cause conflict with individual citizens." (M. Albrow 1970, p.55)
P. Blau (1974) focuses, also, on the dysfunctions of bureaucracy. 
He believes that Weber failed to recognise the dysfunctions that 
bureaucracy creates, such as the encouragement of less personally 
responsible behaviour. Weber focuses on the function of bureaucracy but 
he failed to deal with many problems of their workings. In promotion, 
Weber emphasises the use of objective and rational procedures but failed 
to deal with the value of merit and seniority. For Weber the major 
source of rational-legal authority was knowledge but Blau remarks that 
Weber failed to reckon with the value of professional life. (J Miner 1982) 
Blau considers, too, the orientation that the member of an organisation 
has towards the rules. Through research in two governmental agencies 
he found that the organisations were more efficient when members were 
consciously breaking the rules than following them. "The conclusion of 
Blau’s thesis is that a fresh look has to be taken at the concept of 
rational administration. In a changing environment the stable
attainment of organisational objectives depends on perpetual change in 
the bureaucratic structure. Therefore efficiency cannot be guaranteed by 
tethering the official to a set of rigid rules." (M. Albrow 1970, p.58)
Victor Thompson, also, deals with the dysfunctions and 
inadequacies of bureaucracy. For Thompson (1961), bureaucracy is an
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artificial system and it constitutes a tool which carries out only the goals 
of its owner and not of other claimants such as the employees. 
Thompson considers artificial (bureaucratic) systems under-innovative, 
inflexible and unchangeable. Criticizing bureaucratic impersonality 
Thompson takes up the lack of sympathy and enthusiasm in bureaucracy 
and ends up by suggesting a bureaucratic system more compassionate 
and more sensitive to the needs of individuals. (J. Miner 1982)
Crozier emphasizes, too, the impersonality of the rules, as one of
the basic elements of the bureaucratic vicious circle. ("Four basic
elements seem to be necessary for the stability of the vicious circle we
have observed: the extent of the development of impersonal rules; the
centralization of decision; strata isolation and concomitant group
pressure on the individual; and the development of parallel power
relationships around remaining areas of uncertainty." (Crozier 1965
p.254) Because everything in an organisational process is delimited by
rules, rules for job specification, rules for job allocation, rules for
promotion, "nothing seems to be left for the arbitrary whim and
individual initiative of an organisation member." (Crozier 1965, p.255)
@ .There is, therefore a high degree of predictability of employees' behaviour 
which, in turn, leads to a decline in the hierarchical dependence 
relationships.
The role of superiors is limited to the monitoring of the 
implementation of the rules in as much as they cannot interfere with 
work performance, instructing employees (everything is set by rules) nor
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employees career development (in French public administration 
promotion is based on competitive examinations). Both factors weaken 
the power of superiors over the employees while on the other hand they 
weaken the employees’ bargaining power over superiors. As a
consequence, superiors and subordinates adopt a rapport on a 
conventional basis which lacks emotional commitment. The result of 
such a system is a slowdown of work flow "as a way of expressing the 
fact that rules cannot take care of everything and that management must 
rely on workers' support and must therefore bargain for it." (Crozier 
1965, p.256).
Considering the rules from another perspective Gouldner (1975) 
notices that the proliferation of the impersonal bureaucratic rules 
diminishes the tension which close supervision creates. However, on the 
other hand, the poor performance which results from the implementation 
of the impersonal rules leads to the need for close supervision. Gouldner 
goes further and connects rationality, legality and hierarchy. 
Rationality, as he argues, implies that acts are undertaken for a certain 
reason, to attain a certain goal. However, when behaviour is determined 
by certain rules which enforce unquestioning obedience to superiors, the 
member does not behave "rationally", he/she simply obeys, as he/she does 
not have a clear picture of ends and means guiding the action. 
Therefore rationality seems to be the system which requires non-rational 
behaviour by members.
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Gouldner believes that the meaning of the rule depends on the 
context of their enactment. To this extent, bureaucracy appears under 
three types: The m ock bureaucracy, when none of the members of an 
organisation, neither managers nor employees accept the legitimacy of 
the rules which are imposed on them by an external force. The 
rep resen ta tive  bureaucracy when "all parties to the organisation accept 
not only the legitimacy of the rules, but also the legitimacy of managers 
imposing and workers accepted them" (Clegg 1990). The p u n ish m en t-  
cen tred  bureaucracy where "the rules are enforced by either one party 
or the other, that is by either management or the workers, while the 
other party seeks to avoid them." (Clegg 1990). As Clegg (1990) argues, 
Gouldner's emphasis on rules shows that the same objective bureaucracy 
under different circumstances (different people in different contexts at 
different times) may transform the rules and through them change the 
tendencies and the type of bureaucratization.
When Weber "spoke of rationality and bureaucracy he was talking 
about efficiency" (M. Albrow 1970, p.62) However, various theorists 
reject the idea that bureaucratic organisations are necessarily the most 
efficient. The concept of efficiency seems to be quite ambiguous. 
Albrow (1970), remarks that "It would be quite misleading to equate 
Weber's concept of formal rationality with the idea of efficiency." (p.63).
In other words, Weber's idea about "technical formal rationality" does 
not necessarily mean efficiency.
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Efficiency is linked with the achievement of ends in an 
organisation. However, ends cannot be strictly defined without the 
possibility that different members conceive the ends differently 
(Gouldner 1975). Therefore, even if one identifies irrefutably a most 
efficient mode of achieving a result, the result itself is likely to be open 
to dispute.
Furthermore, experience suggests that when human beings are 
obliged to engage in only one activity with no alternative (routinization 
and repetition) and to that like "machines", then inefficiency creeps in. 
The reaction to such situations, as most evidence suggests, is usually 
slow working or sabotage (M. Benyon 1973, 75). Also absenteeism and 
conflicts are likely to be high in organisations with a highly bureaucratic 
character. That is proved by Elton Mayo (1949) who according to the 
scientific management school expected workers to operate their machine 
highly productively all of their working hours. What he found was that 
workers under such conditions showed high rates of absenteeism and a 
high tendency to staff turnover was noticed. When the conditions 
changed and employees had rest periods and time for contact with 
colleagues, productivity increased and absenteeism and staff turnover 
was reduced. The same idea is reinforced by Gouldner's (1975) research 
in the gypsum mine and factory, where the enforcement of strict 
bureaucratization led a previously peaceful and successful factory to a 
wildcat strike.
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However, "human beings" says Morgan (1986), "have a knack of 
getting trapped in a web of their own creation." (p. 199). It can be 
argued here that people in modem societies have trapped themselves in 
the "iron cage" of bureaucracy. By adopting the TINA (there is no 
alternative) idea and in the name of efficiency they found themselves 
locked in bureaucracies. (Clegg 1990). Bureaucracy promised efficiency, 
through precision, speed and unambiguity and fascinated modem society 
with its simplicity and the success it offers. It became superior over 
every other organisational form. "The hilly developed bureaucratic 
apparatus compares with other organisations exactly as does the machine 
with the non-mechanical modes of production." (Weber 1948). The 
magic word is "machine" and it seems to act determinately in the 
industrialized world inasmuch as it constitutes the basis of progress and 
capitalistic development.
Mechanistic ways of thinking, or living, however, result in 
transforming and distorting human nature. "He who does his work like 
a machine, and he who grows a heart of a machine in his breast loses his 
simplicity. He who has lost his simplicity becomes unsure in the 
striving of his soul." says an old Chinese man to somebody who advised 
him to use a mechanistic way to irrigate his garden. (Morgan 1986) 
The above quotation rings tm e in modem society. "The modem  
world was, by definition an age of uncertainty" states Clegg (1990, p.32).
However, Weber tries to surpass this by stating that bureaucracy 
through its mechanism and principles works for individual members
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freeing them from the inequities of arbitrary authority. He does not 
imply satisfaction or happiness for the member of the orgsmisation but 
he replaces that with equal treatment which prevents them from harm 
or personal friction. He offers rationality as a basis for meritocracy. But 
his scepticism betrays him when he reveals that the bureaucratic 
approach has the potentiality to routinize and mechanize every aspect of 
human life, eroding the human spirit and its capacity for spontaneous 
action. This is the point on which Humanist theorists put emphasis, 
disputing bureaucratic superiority and expressing disenchantment with 
it.
As W. Bennis (1970) states: "The bureaucratic form of
organisation is becoming less and less effective .... it is hopelessly out of 
joint with contemporary realities .... Bureaucracy does not adequately 
allow for personal growth and the development of mature personalities.
It develops conformity and "group thinking". It does not take into 
account the "informal organisation" and the emergent and anticipated 
problems.
Its system of control and authority are hopelessly outdated.
It has no adequate juridical process.
It does not possess adequate means for resolving differences and 
conflicts between ranks and most particularly between functional group.
Communication (and innovative ideas) are thwarted or distorted 
owing to hierarchical divisions.
The full human resources of bureaucracy are not utilized owing to
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mistrust and fear of reprisal. It cannot assimilate the influx of new 
technology or scientists entering the organisation.
It modifies personality structure so that people become and reflect 
the dull grey conditioned "organisational man." (p.3-6).
This strong criticism manifests humanists' faith in human beings 
and their aim to develop human-centred organisations which fulfil the 
needs and wants of human personality. Their perspective, however, led 
some critics to accuse humanism of being "the people without 
organisation" approach in contradiction to what in classical theory is 
considered as "the organisation without people approach."
"Formal rational organisations are based on reducing tasks to 
minimal specialised routines" says G. Argyris (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings 
1983). According to him, such an environment is not suitable for an 
individual to progress from infantile behaviour. The employee adopts a 
myopic view limited to the end of the day's work, unable to see further 
in long term the performance of the organisation as a whole. He/she is 
entrenched by rules and defined tasks and is not interested in the 
possibility of anything more than that. He/she accepts passively the 
position without initiatives. (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings 1983). This 
widespread work apathy and lack of effort along with passivity and 
dependence especially among the lower-level employees are phenomena 
of immaturity, advocates Argyris, and he believes that if employees keep 
behaving immaturely within an organisation it is because they are 
expected to behave in this way. The whole environment is formed in
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such a way as not to allow employees maturity (P. Buchanan, 1985).
Besides maturity, in bureaucracies, members adopt mindless and 
unquestioning attitudes which they express by saying "it is not my job to 
worry about that" or "I'm here to do what I'm told." These are not the 
attitudes of employees, states Morgan (1986) , these are inherent traits 
in the mechanistic approach to organisation. "Defining work 
responsibilities in a clear-cut manner has the advantage of letting 
anyone know what is not expected of them. But it also lets them know 
what is not expected of them." (G. Morgan, 1986, p. 36).
According to Morgan, bureaucracy, also, encourages people to obey 
orders while discouraging initiatives. This unquestioning obedience to 
orders works as a justification to employees who make deliberate 
mistakes on the premise that they are obeying orders. Apathy, as a 
result of people's feeling of powerlessness in the face of problems, 
carelessness and lack of pride are also consequences of the mechanistic 
approach. This approach seems to limit the development of human 
capacities trying to fit people in the organisation rather than the 
opposite. In this very way, people lose their hfe working without 
satisfaction while organisations are deprived from human creativity and 
ingenuity. They operate a system of incompetence where the employees 
of the lower positions leave the initiatives to those in the higher and in 
reverse the latter expect the former to deal with specific problems which 
are remote from their general sphere of competence. (Marx's view in C. 
Lefort 1985).
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Job dissatisfaction leads the bureaucrat to be preoccupied only 
with the pursuit of the highest hierarchichal position, converting the 
work itself to an apparatus for the preservation of his status within the 
organisation. (C. Lefort 1985). That means that the bureaucrat has 
different goals from those of the organisation, a fact which proves the 
value of the inapplicable "substantial discipline" in bureaucracies. It also 
shows the desire for power and control, as authority is associated with 
the position one holds. (Morgan 1986). In this sense bureaucracy 
appears as a network of personal relationships of dependence while in 
addition a creation of cliques appears whose conflicts include those of the 
formal hierarchy and tend continuously to restructure it according to 
their demands. (C. Lefort 1985),
However, bureaucrats in their transaction with clients appear to 
be unsociable. This unsociable behaviour of employees is considered by 
some theorists as a reaction against the mechanistic framework imposed 
on them. It is believed that the formalization and strict discipline work 
on the personality to produce resistance and resentment. Theses in turn 
lead to enforcement of oppressive methods and procedurees with respect 
to serving clients or with respect to employees’ function within the 
organisation. (Athanasopoulos 1983).
Hummel’s research into efficiency in bureaucracies led him to 
question "how efficiency is emphasized in bureaucracies to the point of 
creating emotionless bureaucrats and frustration among clients who 
resent being shuffled around hke numbers." While Kreitner argues that
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"what may in fact be a bureaucracy's well-oiled efficiency is often 
perceived as inefficiency by clients and customers who see their cases 
passed firom one coldly impersonal specialist to another." (R. Kreitner, 
p.247).
Rigidity in employees' behaviour seems to be another factor which 
leads to conflic with clients. This rigidity of employees derives from 
their attempt to follow the rules precisely. As Cherrington (1989) 
remarks, whereas wise bureaucrats know when to deviate from the rules 
and accept responsibility for any decision they reach, the others, who are 
afraid of undertaking responsibilities seek to protect themselves by 
following the rules precisely. (Merton 1940). The latter unable to use 
the discretion of the law or the authority of the position they hold and 
therefore they are particularly insensitive to individual problems, 
sticking to the rules and their behaviour generates difficulty with clients. 
According to Cherrington (1989) the more the clients complain and 
demand individual treatment the more strictly the bureaucrats follow the 
rules.
The inadequate relationships between bureaucrats and clients 
gives bureaucracy a bad reputation. The bureaucratic dysfunction which 
appear in everyday transactions are unable to be corrected, as 
bureaucracies are characterized as the organisation which "cannot correct 
their behaviour by their errors." (Crozier 1965, p.254). As far as their 
members are concerned bureaucracies seem to routinize and alienate 
their members' life by defining their overall behaviour starting from
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their smile towards the clients and reaching ever the way they must be 
dressed. (Morgan 1986).
In conclusion, one can say that bureaucracy has been attacked by 
several theorists, who while criticizing its advantages suggest that they 
are at the same time its great disadvantages. Although bureaucracy 
seems to be the most appropriate mode of administration for large 
organisations, it is doubtful if it entails efficiency. Furthermore, its 
rationality is in doubt if only to the extent that the rules do not seem to 
cover any contingency". (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980, p. 168). The 
consequence of bureaucracy on employees’ and clients’ lives seems to be 
detrimental, as it has the tendency to treat individuals as automatons. 
Bureaucracy can do so because it has power and control over its 
members. This will be the discussion in the next section.
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1.4. Bureaucracy -  Pow er and P olitics
Bureaucracy incorporates a theory of power. At least, that is 
shown by the way nearly all theorists have accepted the broad definition 
of power given by Weber according to which: "Power is the probability 
that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry 
out his own will despite resistance and regardless of the basis on which 
this probability rests." (Weber 1947, in S. Bacharach E. Lawler 1981,
p. 16).
However, power is considered by the various theorists in different 
perspectives with subtle or not-so-subtle deviations from the basic idea. 
Therefore Blau (1964) defines power as "the ability of persons or groups 
to inmpose their will on others despite resistance through difference 
either in the form of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the 
form of punishment inasmuch as the former, as well, as the latter, 
constitutes in effect negative sanction." For Mechanic (1962) Power is 
"a force that results in behaviour that would not have occurred if the 
forces had not been present." Kaplan (1964) however, sees power as the 
ability of one person or group of persons to influence the behaviour of 
others, that is, to change the probabilities that others will respond in 
certain ways to specified stimuli." While Dahl (1957) states that: "A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that he 
would not otherwise do."
The above definitions introduce power in an interactive situation
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and so they are consistent with the Weberian theory of power which, 
also, considers it in an interactionist perspective.
Parson, however defines power in relation to authority; "...power 
and authority would more likely be viewed as dual structures, both 
simultaneously present, in subtle and continual interaction. Power, in 
short, exists not simply when authority breaks down, or before authority 
has had a chance to mature. It exists as a factor in the lives of 
subordinates, shaping their behaviour and beliefs, at every moment of 
their relations with those above them... Legitimacy and authority never 
elminate power; they merely defocalize it, make it latent." (Goulder 
1971, p.234).
Therefore, while power is the capacity of a person or a group to 
secure compliance from another person or group, authority, as Weber and 
other theorists believe, is the right to secure compliance. However, for 
a ruler the use of this right depends on his or her ability to find support 
or legislation in the beliefs of the ruled (Morgan 1986). In this sense 
authority is defined as legitimate power and is backed by legitimacy. 
(Cherrington 1989).
Legitimacy, however, imphes that subordinates not only accept the 
authority of the superior but, also, "the rationale or justification (explicit 
or implicit) for attaching authority to certain positions and occupants."
(Bacharach and Lawler 1980, p.39). That appears in organisations with 
the structure of the organisational hierarchy where at each level 
supervisors are expected to influence the behaviour of their subordinates
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while they are expected in turn to respond to the influence of those above 
them. To this extent the flow of influence from the top of hierarchy 
downwards, which implies power of superiors over the subordinates, 
constitutes the authority structure. Authority requires obedience, and 
from recent research (St, Milgram 1973) it has been highlighted that 
there is a high tendency for individuals to comply with legitimate 
authority. "Individuals had been taught to obey people in authority as 
part of the basic socialization process." States Cherrington (1989, p.703) 
while, he also remarks that "obedience is necessaiy for continued 
membership. If they refuse to comply with the accepted rules and 
norms, they can be expelled from the organisation (p.703).
French and Raven (1959) indicate five possible bases of power: 
coercion, rewards, expertise, legitimacy and referent power. Legitimacy 
has already been mentioned as the authority-power based on the right 
of the superior to impose her/his will to subordinates and to require 
obedience by them. Focusing on the other bases of power one could 
characterize referent power as the interpersonal power based on 
identification with others and it is mostly linked with charismatic 
authority.
Coercion and rewards are connected with punitive aspects of power 
and whereas "coercion" means "the threat of decreasing another’s 
outcomes" reward is "the promise of increasing those outcomes." 
(Bacharach and Lawler 1980, p.33) Reward and coercion are related to 
confromity within bureaucracy and operate through control. In the past
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conformity was obtained in a harsh and direct way, but in modern 
organisations it is achieved in more sophisticated ways, such as through 
education. As has been mentioned above "people have been taught to 
obey..."
"...through their education, have already internalized a number of basic 
conformities and a general ability to conform easily to an organisation's 
way." states "Crozier (1965, p.251). Furthermore, according to him, 
because nowadays human behaviour is better understood and therefore 
more predictable, modem organisations use more indirect and 
intellectual means of conformity.
Expertise is another main source of power in bureaucracy, and 
implies the specialized knowledge, the "technical" knowledge about the 
various activities within an organisation. This is, also, what gives a 
prestige to the status of bureaucrat.
"The political master always finds himself v is-a -v is the trained 
official, in the position of a dil ettante facing the expert." says Weber 
(1947). However, the knowledge which is related to specific issues or is 
connected with certain skills is a source of power only if there is a critical 
need for the expert that can not be obtained somewhere else. In this 
sense, expertise to maintain a source of power requires a continuous 
training of the expert in order to improve the knowledge and the skills 
according to demands. (Cherrington 1989).
"The progressively increasing power of bureaucracies and 
bureaucrats" states E. Wright (1978) "grows out of several interconnected
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characteristics of bureaucratic organisations: (1) the practical
effectiveness and increasing indispensability of bureaucratic 
organisations, (2) the expert technical knowledge controlled by the 
bureaucrats and (3) the "administrative secrets" (knowledge about the 
inner workings of the bureaucracy) controlled by bureaucrats. This last 
element is especially important. Outsiders are in a weak position not 
merely because of the technical expertise of the bureaucrats but becaue 
of the bureaucratic control of files, information and procedures." (E.G. 
Wright 1978, p. 185).
In addition to the five bases of power reported above, another one 
was added later by Haven, (1974); Raven and Kruglanski; (1970) 
namely information. "This consists of the access or opportunity actors 
have to gain information about the inner workings of the organisation or 
about the relation of the organisation to the environment. This 
information may or may not be related to the actor's level in the 
hierarchy of authority." (Bacharach and Lawler 1980, p.33). This 
newly-appeared power, whose establishment as a base of power, seems 
to have a relation with the advance of technology (use of computers), can 
be found even in low hierarchical level subordinates (secretaries.) 
Therefore, effective use of this element by subordinates, reinforces their 
status in the organisation giving them much more power than could be 
expected for the official post they hold.
Perhaps, this last basis of power underlies the "taking power" 
which Bacharach and Lawler (1980) introduce in their work. As they
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remark organisational studies have neglected the possibility that 
subordinates will take power that given to them in the organisational 
structure. This particular power, the "talking power" seems to appear 
in the extent that organisation is considered as a political model. 
"Individuals and subgroups within organisations are not passive 
recipients awaiting the downward trickle of power but rather active 
participants mobilizing power for their own ends." (Bacharach and 
Lawler 1980, p.42).
As I will elaborate later, this "taking power" from the point of view 
of the G.P.A. is obtained through idividuals' and groups' Political 
affiliations. This tendency of employees in organisations, especially in 
State bureaucracies, explains to a degree why Political involvement is 
determined in some bureaucracies. Backed by Political affiliations 
subordinates especially, draw power by participating in the decision­
making through informal procedures, using the formal organisational 
structure as the means to legitimize the informalities. This phenomenon 
appears stronger when cultural traits reinforce the employees' tendency 
of "taking power". The findings of this research, which will be presented 
in later chapters, support the idea of Bacharach and Lawler (1980).
Another question, also, emerges in this point; whether or not 
there is a relation between bureaucracy and Politics. Woodrow Wilson 
was a strong advocate of the dichotomy between Politics and 
Adminstration: "The field of administration is a field of business.
Administration lies outside the sphere of politics. Administrative
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questions are not political questions." he states. (Woodrow Wilson in G.
Peters, 1978.p.4) For him Politics and the nature of political systems 
had no impact in organisational structure as being too separable from 
administration. This view is consistent with the bureaucratic one which 
attributes a kind of neutrality to bureaucracy as being able to serve, 
equally successfully every political system.
On the contrary, recent theoretical approaches, such as "the power 
and politics school" approach, view organisations "as political systems 
permeated with conflict and power struggles to determine who gets what, 
when and how." (F. Heffron 1989). Especially when the reference is to 
the public sector, administration can never be divorced from Politics, 
remarks F. Heffron.
Lenin also places an emphasis on the link of State bureaucracy 
with Politics. The State bureaucracy for him is the target of the 
continuous struggle of the main political parties in order to possess the 
administrative positions.
Guy Peters (1978) dealing with Public administration, argues that |
administration is intimately involved with a variety of political actors j
and political acts and he believes that it operates in a political arena. iJ
According to him this linkage is expressed by the participation of Public 
Administration in the Public Policy while in the formulation of the Public 
policy the political system is involved. He, also, bounds administration 
with responsibility when "their style in handling clients, the courtesy and 
consideration they show, as well as their competence can do a great deal
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toward defining the role and the respect of the political system in the 
society: (G. Peters 1978, p. 12).
From another perspective, Clegg (1990) signifies in Weberian 
terms the relation between bureaucracy and Politics. "The Political 
leader is engaged in a struggle for power... In order to exercise power 
in the pursuit of such ultimate values the political leader must be able 
to call upon a reliable administrative staff as an instrument of authority. 
This involves a bureaucracy. Members of this bureaucracy must prove 
themselves by impartial performance, while political leadership proves 
itself in the competition of votes during elections...". (Clegg 1990, p.37). 
In this sense bureaucratic organisation as Clegg remarks "is simply a 
tool in the hands of political masters." But that is the 'ideal' which is 
rarely attained in the practice.
Subsequent chapters of this thesis will discuss the way in which 
bureaucratic principles, as they are established in the G.P.A. actually 
operate in practice.
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed several of the major theories of 
bureaucracy available in sociological literature. Bureaucracy not only 
dominates organisational life in late twentienth century society, it, also 
contains several important paradoxes.
Its first paradox is that while bureaucracy appears to promise 
efficiency, in practice it contains a great deal of negative connotations 
and is often associated with inefficiency. The second paradox derives 
from the rules which constitute the foundation stone of bureaucracy. 
The creators of the rules are at the same time subject to the rules they 
create.
Most organisational theorists, regardless of their political views, 
regard bureaucracy as inevitable. What makes it so is its simplicity in 
use and the speed and precision of its procedures but also the way it 
transmits power and allocates authority. Rules are at the same time the 
advantages and disadvantages of bureaucracy. They on the one hand 
secure equal treatment of employees while on the other hand provide 
those in power with extensive control. Rules, then are rather imposed 
on employees than argued through dialogue. Bureaucracy, according 
to Weber and his supporters when it starts never stops.
Bureaucracy has been criticized for the mechanistic way it 
operates and for its impact on the lives of its members and clients. 
Despite its advantages, such as equal treatment of all employees, it is
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evident that bureaucracy neglects the potentialities of the human 
personality, restricting the chances for initiatives and therefore 
creativity. Bureaucracy tends to create and maintain immature people 
with no imagination, defined actions and rigid behaviour. It also 
enforces them to an unconscious discipline which in turn generates 
resentment and resistance and develops forms of unwillingness for 
collaboration, symptoms which emerge in the every day conduct of 
bureaucrata with clients. Bureaucracy seems to deprive its members of 
"ideals" and values which make their work meaningul.
The domination of bureaucracy on public organisations reveals the 
link of bureaucracy with Politics. In this sense, bureaucracy obtains 
much more power as it plays a decisive role in the society. As Hegel 
advocates, bureaucracy is the bridge beetween the state and its citizens. 
It is the factor which through routine practices and its members' 
behaviour greatly affects the creation of the image of the state.
However, there is a great number of theorists who do not accept 
the relation of bureaucracy with Politics, believing that they are two 
separate spheres. Nevertheless, recent organisational approaches take 
account of Politics, in a broader perspective when considering 
bureaucracy.
The area which seems to be neglected by the above longstanding 
debate is the way in which Political factors interrelate with bureaucratic 
structures within the workplace. The findings presented in the following 
chapters will seek to contribute to this debate by highlighting and
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analyzing the relationship between Politics and Bureaucracy in the 
G.P.A.
The significance of Politics in the G.P.A. is the factor h igh li^ ted  
by subsequent chapters which focus on control and culture within G.P.A.
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CHAPTER n  : Bureaucracy and Greek Public Adm inistration  
n.l Introduction
This chapter considers the central bureaucratic characteristics of 
the G.P.A. In the preceding chapter bureaucracy was defined as the 
most widely applied organisational form in our modem society. It has 
also already been mentioned that because of its nature, bureaucracy is 
the basic form which states use to organize their public administration.
Therefore, in this chapter, the bureaucratic structure of the G..P.A. 
is considered along with its peculiarities. The way that the G.P.A. is 
structured as weU as the way it expresses its bureaucratic tendencies is 
also highlighted. Interpretations for the peculiar bureaucratic model of 
the G.P.A. will be sought at the beginning in its historical development.
In subsequent chapters explanations for the G.P.A.'s operation will also be 
sought in its organisational culture and in managerial control.
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II.2 Is the G.PjV. bureaucratic?
2.a The formal structure of the G.P.A,
The G.P.A. seems to fulfil the bureaucratic principles as they have 
been described by Weber. Its formal structure reveals the existence of 
a state bureaucracy.
Adopting the view of Stasinopoulos (1957) we can define Public 
Administration to mean "whatever remains after the subtraction of 
legislative and judicial power"; in other words "...all the public services, 
where these public services are the ones embodied in the executive power 
of the state." (p.35) The pubhc services are divided into central and 
regional services, not only because of their geographical position but also 
because of the nature of the service they provide and the range of 
responsibilities they bear.* The services belong to the various 
ministries, according to the sector they serve. There are twenty (20) 
ministries with different areas of responsibilities and services provided.
* The central services mainly provide counsel, planning and 
organisations which have territorial jurisdiction for the whole state, while 
the regional services carry out executive work, with territorial 
jurisdiction limited to specific administrative districts.
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Every Ministry is headed by a Minister, who delegates 
responsibility for certain sectors to one or two Undersecretaries of State 
(they vary at every Ministry) by joint decision with the Prime Minister. 
Every M inistiy also has a Secretary General appointed by Presidential 
Decree at the proposal of the Prime Minister and Responsible Minister 
with specific administrative responsibility. Some Ministries, such as the 
Ministry of National Education and Rehgion, have Secretaries as 
"Specialists" (top managers) who also have particular administrative 
responsibility.
The basic structural units in central Ministerial services are 
General Directorates, Services, Directorates and Divisions.* The number 
of units varies in every Ministry. In every unit there are relevant 
superiors. Therefore, there are Secretaries "Specialists" (top-managers) 
for the General Directorates, Directors (managers) for the services and 
the Directorates and Head of Divisions (supervisors) for the Divisions.
* Most of the information used here has been abstracted from a booklet 
entitled "Greek Public Administration" by E. Zacharioudakis (1980) Head 
of the Division of the Ministry to the Presidency.
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These structures are presented in figure 1 and 2.
MINISTRY
SERVICE
A' GENERAL 
DIRECTORATE
A' DIRECTORATE B’ DIRECTORATE
B’ GENERAL 
DIRECTORATE
A’ DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE3 ^ ^
FIGURE 1 : The structure of the Ministry in the G.P.A.
Minister 
Undersecretary
Members of Cabinet
Secretary General
Secretary "Specialist" Secretary "J^ciaiist' 
"Political officials" jfCT"
 7 --------------  ^Director Director'^Directorirector^Director Director
oD /H oD  HoD HoD HoD HoD HoD HoD HoD HoD HoD^HoDX X X A X A A A A X  X._A.
_____________Administrative staff o f various ranks and classes___________
HoD : Head of Division
FIGURE 2 : Administrative staff in a Greek ministry
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There are, however, services which belong to a Ministiy, but 
operate in an independent way either because of the nature of their work 
or because of their legislative status (Technological Educational 
Institutes, Universities etc.). In every Ministry there are, also, collective 
bodies; usually two, namely "Service Council" and "Discipline Council" 
and they make decisions about personnel affairs.
Employees in the Public Services are classified into "classes" 
according to the educational degree they hold (N. 1586/1-4-1986). 
Therefore, there are four classes of employees: HE (university 
qualifications), TE (vocational education qualifications). AE (secondary 
education qualifications) m d 2E (basic education qualifications, or 
certificates of work experience).
The hierarchical scale is also divided into four grades. A, B, F and 
A and the promotion from one grade to a higher one (The highest is A) 
is a matter of seniority accompanied according to law, with appraisal of 
the employee's overall organisational behaviour. The employees of the 
classes HE and TE reach the highest grade A each according to a 
different tim e-scale. However, for employees in the 2E class, the highest 
grade which they can attain in their career is F.
The allocation of personnel in every Ministry or in every service is 
regulated by particular laws or decrees, which also define the number of 
the administrative units (General Directorates, Directorates etc.) and the 
number of personnel required.
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As the following section outlines, the actual experience of 
conducting the research provided important and significant indications 
of the social and organisational problems which characterize the G.P.A.
2.b. The "bureaucratic" G.P.A. in reality
A recent study of N. Varelidis (1983) introduces the G.P.A. as a 
Traditional Public Bureaucracy, the operation of which is delimited in the 
following context:
Chentelism (use of political influence to further personal 
and political interests) 
lack of accountability 
citizen mistrust of the state machinery 
Strong state control of the pubhc sector (through extaiâve 
formalization, regulation and political managers). 
Furthermore, it is the every day citizens' perception which identifies 
pubhc administration as bureaucracy. In this sense, of course the 
bureaucratic characterization is far from the scientific perception of the 
term, as it imphes the dysfunctions which affects the hves of the citizens 
either as servants of the institution or as subjects of its actions.
However, as we saw above, the G.P.A. is a state organisation 
consisting of a set of offices, staffed with administrative personnel who 
have been appointed under certain procedures and governed by a leader.
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It is characterized by a hierarchical structure of authority and 
supposedly operates according to universal and impersonally enacted 
rules. The main written rule is the "Greek Constitution" which delimited 
the political, social and economic activities within the state.
The leader of the G.P.A. according to the Greek Constitution is the 
Prime Minister who governs the state along with the Cabinet. The 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet come from one of the three main political 
parties, after General Elections which take place every four years, 
according to the law. The political parties which appear in the political 
scene of the Greek State are: The right wing party so-called New 
Democracy (N.A.) which adopts a liberal ideology. The socialist party, 
which is called Panhellenic Socialistic Movement (I1A20K) and expresses 
a socialist ideology and the left wing party under the name "Coalition" 
(2YN) which reflects the communistic ideologies.
The percentages of voters which each party represents (according 
to the last elections in April 1990) are approximately 47% NA, 40% 
IIA20K, and 10% 2YN.
The formation and the operation of the political parties is a 
question of political history. What, however, concerns this study is the 
role which these parties play in thé administrative procedures and the 
political clhnate they formulate and within which the G.P.A. is required 
to operate.
There is no doubt that the G.P.A. appears to be extremely 
dependent on Politics. There are a number of symptoms which signify
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this fact, regardless of the legal frame-work which requires a neutral 
G.P.A.. The principles of neutrality of the G.P.A. in legal terms is found 
in the Constitution in the provisions which concern public servants’ 
restrictions as far as the matter of their political convictions is concerned. 
In this sense public servants are not allowed to participate in general 
elections as candidates unless they resign from their administrative 
position. The Constitution, also, requires that public servants be 
executors of the will of the state (consequently not executors of a 
particular custodian of the levers of state power elected at any particular 
time and to serve the public interest.
As Sabino Cassese (in Flogaitis 1987) argues, the impartiahty of 
Public Administration exists in principle in order to protect the clients 
in their relation to the Public Administration to protect the Public 
Administration of the Party Political power of the government, to protect 
the Public Administration in its relations with the interests which are 
developed within society. (Flogaitis 1987)
However, the impartiality (neutrality) of the G.P.A. seems to be 
limited only in the above mentioned theoretical application of the 
Constitution, which, however, does not secure the "informal" involvement 
of public servants in Political activities. As will be presented in 
subsequent chapters these informal activities seem to be detrimental to 
the G.P.A. operation.
One important result of the relationship between the G.P.A. with 
Politics is the excessive number of public servants who are
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accommodated in the various services of the G.P.A. This phenomenon 
used to be called "hydrocephalism" of the G.P.A. This refers to the 
appointment of too many public servants to fill too few places. As this 
is analyzed in the next section, historically this phenomenon was the 
result of the climate of Political clientelism and of patronage. As Etzioni 
Halery (1979) has remarked "fragmentation makes the system to manage 
not via universalistic programmes, but via particularistic allegiances, 
obtaineed through client dealings." (Clegg, Bow, Bareham 1983, p. 148) 
Thus before an election, usually, a number of people are appointed in the 
G.P.A. even under temporary contracts but having the promise from their 
"patrons^ to transform the temporary to the permanent, "the assumption 
being that the voters will then feel a moral obligation (or find it in their 
interest) to support the donors at the polls -  or even to be active on 
behalf of the donating party" (Etzioni Halery 1979, p. 11). Therefore 
personnel who are allocated to the various services of the public sector 
amounted to 452.046 employees in 31.12.1987 (A. Makridimitris 1990). 
Accoridng to the study of A Makridimitris entitled: "Characteristics of 
the Greek Administrative Crisis'' the above mentioned personnel are not 
included in the personnel of the National Health Service, Medical and 
Nursing staff of IKA, Juridical Bodies, Educational Staff at all levels, 
Military, Police or Harbour police and fait which gives the real picture 
of the "hydrocephalism" (over numerousness) of the G.P.A., given that the 
Greek population is approximately 10,000000, In 1890 a traveller wrote: 
"No where else can you find more public servants than in Greece. It is
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reckoned that public servants along with their families are 12% of the 
Greek population." (Tsoukalas 1985)
Yet, how is it that the G.P.A. recruited too many personnel? 
Although this question will be analyzed in subsequent chapters it is 
worth mentioning here that the various laws which concerned the 
recruitment of personnel in the G.P.A. were full of loopholes such as the 
fact that recruitment was detemined by Political power. Even when the 
laws secured a kind of equahty and meritocracy, selectors, drawing upon 
Political power, ignored them and found other indirect ways to recruit 
personnel. Therefore, although there is a law (N. 1735/88) which refers 
to a selection system, from 1.1.1989 until 28.1.1989 36,000 employees 
were appointed without the use of that law. (Public Sector Magazine) 
This excessive amount of personnel seems to be the basis for the 
formation of a particular social class, "The public servemts act more and 
more like a well organised social power whose main concern is to secure 
jobs and the unobstracted career development...(Flogatis 1985, p.51). As 
Flogaitis remarks party political powers react to this view of public 
servants and through over legislation try to protect their power and to 
control the G.P.A.
"Actually, from experience, we know that the law usually 
constitutes an easy plea, a weapon or a defence but very rarely 
constitutes a rule of behaviour" states G. Langrond in his report about 
the G.P.A. He, however, remarks that the Greek mentality is concerned 
to create laws which are not implemented. In a three year period
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(December 1974 -  September 1977) 755 laws were enacted. (Pagakis 
1988) This massive creation of laws produces major problems for the 
G.P.A. and constitutes a source of fear for the client who will never 
become aware of provisions which might interest them. Yet, by contrast, 
public servants appear to adhere to the laws and therefore avoid 
initiative and the development of their imagination. (Flogaitic 1987) 
Nevertheless, the rules do not seem to serve impartiality as they 
are not always impersonal. It is very common for rules to be 
promulgated in order to cover individual cases or to serve particular 
interests. This is pointed out by Mouzelis (1978): "There are, for
instance, numerous examples in Greek parliamentary history of laws 
tailored to suit particular, political influential capitalists, and of cases 
where huge state resources are channelled into an area where the 
political clientele of the relevant Minister are located." (p.265)
Another symptom which emerges in the G.P.A. and highlights the 
interrelation of Politics with the bureaucratic procedures, is one related 
to the so-called career officials." What is implied by "career officials" is 
that the job constitutes a career based on a system of promotion 
according to seniority or to achievement or both. In the G.P.A.,although 
the job constitutes a career, it depends mainly on the Political convictions 
of the employees. Therefore the promotion system, which is based on the 
highly subjective appraisal of employees' performance, contradicts the 
meritocratic principles which it formally supposes. However, the 
indifference of public servants towards promotion, gives discretion to the
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leadership to promote those whom they prefer. The findings of this 
research highlight this issue in the next chapter.
The last law (N. 1586) which concerned the promotion of public 
servants to position of Directors, Head of Division and Managers, never 
came entirely into effect or was implemented only by a part of the G.P.A. 
However, until now every government coming into power has moved the 
employees holding managerial posts. "It is no coincidence, that the first 
concern of every government is to change the superiors of the G.P.A. 
reports the magazine Public Sector, suggesting the way in which Political 
intervention affects this bureaucratic procedure.
The way the promotion system is implemented causes a large 
number of moral problems. The performance appraisal as it is depicted 
in the official reports exudes a sort of superficiality and irresponsibility. 
As public servants explain in subsequent chapters, they do not trust this 
promotion system and sometimes they do not respect their superior 
because they too are products of such a system. The other problem, 
which will be discussed in the fourth chapter, is that managerial control 
suffers from either arbitrarism (as a defence of inherent weakness) or of 
non-existence. There is a lack of incentive, too, and as G. Pagakis (1988) 
reports in the magazine Public Sector, the last few laws concerning 
public servants' career development set rather negative incentives.
Therefore, it is not surprising, as subsequent chapters illustrate, 
that public servants respond to this situation with apathy, absenteeism, 
poor performance and give the idea that "the working hours tend to be
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equal to the time of their physical presence in the public services and 
nothing more." (Tsoukalas 1987) Furthermore, there are the cases of 
those who try to escape from this situation by involving themselves in 
jobs outside the office while performing part of this "outside job" during 
their working time in the public service. My personal experience has 
provided me with relevant examples such as of the manager who 
prepared his lecture for the afternoon course he run in a vocational 
school, locked in his office and not willing to be disturbed.
The lack of incentives is accompanied by a lack of training and of 
application of new technological advance. As G. Langrond (1964) 
remarks, in the entire administrative process, lack of appropriate means 
glides along with the lack of rational and emotional orientation of the 
public servants towards new administrative methods and substantial 
discipline.
If one put all these issues together we might be led to the thought 
that Politics deliberately neglects the procedures which would make life 
in the G.P.A. meaningful. Where the presence of Politics is not obvious 
it is, however, creeping in. The picture of the G.P.A. is incomplete 
without Politics underlying every procedure. The prevailing spirit, which 
requires a public servant to be merely an executor, does not leave room 
for independent action and initiative.
The result is that described in the introduction of this study: 
paralysis of the G.P.A. administrative inertia, irresponsibility servility of
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public servants and degradation of their status. It is also the lack of 
"absolute values" as Weber would say, which leads employees to an 
emotional withdrawal from their job; while increasing the employees' 
tendency to identify themselves through informal groups and informal 
activities which also have Politics as a reference point.
The historical development at the G.P.A. which follows will 
illuminate some of the reasons why the G.P.A. operates in the way which 
was described above.
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II.3 History of the G.P.A.
The history of the G.P.A. follows the politico-economic evolution 
of Greek society. It depicts the adventurous historical life of the Greek 
State and reveals a number of imported western cultural traits.
As various Greek historians and sociologist have remarked, Greek 
society after four hundred years under the Turkish occupation sought for 
its historical roots in the Hellenism of the diaspora. Greek ancient 
history and Greek philosophy had been retained considerably by the 
Greeks of the West. To the West the independent state turned to find its 
roots. (Tsoukalas 1986) The Hellinism of the diaspora had developed 
remarkable economic and intellectual progress, which was placed at the 
disposal of the newly-established state. This "intellectual" class along 
with its intelligence conveyed the influence of the culture of Western 
Europe. All the social and economic changes of the West had affected 
these people who transplanted thoughts and ideas and strategies to the 
Greek society which never practised similar changes and therefore did 
not have a suitable background for such institutions. They established 
a juridical regime, which was reinforced by the administrative Bavarian 
school which King Otto and his Regency represented. The laws became 
powerful weapons in the hands of the authority, as they could control 
through them the class of public servants which started to increase 
rapidly. However the primary idea of the juridical regiure along with the 
centralization of the authority was the creation of a "nationalistic
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consciousness." (Mouzelis 1978)
The first reason therefore which negatively affected the further 
development of the G.P.A. was the implementation of foreign prototypes 
and examples in an inadequate social-economic ground. (G. Langro vid 
1964). Another reason for the peculiar operation of the G.P.A. must be 
sought in the development of the authority and the economy of Greece.
The Monarchic regime that the Great Powers located in Greece 
relied for its domination on the contribution of a handful of oligarchic |
families, the so-called "tzakia" (Mouzelis 1978). The tzakia in turn 
obtained their power from their capacity to control the economy and the 
voters in the newly-established state. The development of the 
parliamentary institutions increased the power of the "tzakial as they 
could bargain the power of the electorate assuring for them positions in 
the State apparatus which they could control. (Mouzelis 1978) It is in 
this that one finds the start of the political clientelism which has now 
rooted deeply into the culture of Greek society, and still plagues it today.
Two informal institutions appear in the clientistic process which 
maintain their status even now, however, under more sophisticated 
guises. These are the institutions of "Koumbaros" and "Kommatarchis." 
"Koumbaros" is the Godfather and because of the Greeks religious belief 
this relationship is socially very important. Therefore politicians, 
exploited the power of this religious relationship to obtain political 
friends. Politicians usually had countless numbers of God children 
(Mouzelis 1978). Godfather in terms of politics means "patron" of the
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family. The obligation the family has towards the Godfather is to vote 
in favour of him and to support him by influencing more people in favour 
of him. (Vakalopoulos 1983, Pagakis 1988).
The institution of "Kommatarchis" on the other hand implies in a 
clear-cut manner the party political bargain. "Kommatarchis" is the 
"representative" of the politician in the society of the village at the 
beginning but it is a practice which later was to spread even into the 
urban centres. The "Kommatarchis" emerged when the local landowner 
of the Turkish occupation era turned into a powerful politician when the 
state was established. Therefore, he had to move to the capital, where 
the centralized government was located. However, he needed a mediator 
in order to control the peasants who looked after his property in the one 
hand and who affected his political career on the other hand. 
"Kommatarchis" therefore was a mediator. However this role was 
powerful as having power both over the master (affecting the voter in 
favour of him) and the agrarians (mediating in favour of them to their 
master either for a position in the G.P.A. or for any other reason). The 
fact of the deprivation of the agrarian areas and people's need for 
dependence on the state budget, increased the power of the 
"Kommatarchis. "
This premature dependence of agrarian society on the state 
generated the political patronage which in turn became a vital need for 
the peasants in order to survive and promote their interests. (Mouzelis 
1978) The Greek economic system transformed into a capitalistic system
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without, however, going through a gradual development. This was 
because Greece had been occupied for 400 years by Turkey and had 
therefore not experienced a feudalistic form of society. The state budget 
because the only source of life for the developing society. Thus the 
dependence of the citizens on the state budget became an end in itself. 
Administrative "hydrocephalism" (accumulation of employees) is therefore 
a consequence of the economic development of the state. (Tsoukalas 
1986)
The administrative staff which first served the G.P.A. came from 
the class of "national beneficiaries'* that is to say, the people who had 
financially supported the revolution of the G.P.A. The state, therefore 
tried to pay them off by granting them administrative positions. 
However, as has been mentioned above, these people coming from the 
powerful social class required the highest administrative positions in 
order to maintain their power. This movement for the possession of the 
highest administrative posts was reinforced by the Bavarians who 
accompanied King Otto in 1833. They required, too, the highest position 
in order to control the activities of the state. As a result administrative 
"hydrocephalism" was intensified at the highest hierarchical ranks. 
(Tsoukalas 1986)
This phenomenon remained until today, as the "national 
beneficiaries'* and the Bavarians were replaced by "favoured** public 
servants or experts. The bureaucratic structure of the G.P.A. because of 
the inertia it facilitates, does not seem to have any intention for changes
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and thus, this peculiar structure maintains as a static inflexible 
character. (Tsoukalas 1978)
The role of the first appointed administrative staff was to serve the 
goals the Monarchy sets. Therefore, they appear in a kind of neutrality 
in relation to the political parties. However, later, when the 
parliamentary institutions were developed the public servants were in 
poor circumstances. Because of the active "patronage" and the climate 
of political clientelism the position of public servants were entirely 
unstable. Greek political history has a number of pages devoted to the 
practice which developed in relation to the administrative staff. Every 
change of the political party in power was followed by a massive 
dismissal of public servants, in order to be replaced by others politically 
affiliated to the party in power. (Papachatsis 1983)
"Characteristic of that period was the factional spirit and 
unscrupulousness of public servants, improper allotment of justice, 
disdain for the laws widespread corruption. The selection of 
administrative staff would be determined; a) not by the necessary moral 
administrative qualifications, but by favouritism, granted by the party in 
power, b) by the situation in the service; the development of the 
administrative servant did not depend on proficiency and productivity 
but on the need for personal loyalty and faith to the party, c) by the 
dismissal of the administrative servants which was a matter of "group 
dismissal"; they were replaced by others, without questioning if, among 
the dismissed, there were people moral, capable and useful to the
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service." (Pan-Poulis 1987, p.77-78)
Ch. Trikoupis, (Prime Minister in 1877) tried to overcome this 
situation through various proposed alterations in the treatment of public 
servants. Under laws XNZ71877 and XNST71877 the tenure of the 
public servants became more secure. Also, issues like promotion, 
selection were affected. Thus, the institution of exams along with formal 
qualifications is established whereas before and under the law NT73-6- 
1864 the appointment of public servants relied on Ministers’ discretion 
for the lower rank employees and on the King’s discretion for the more 
senior position. A great deal of effort for public servants’ permanence 
came with law AP^X’/10-5-1984 "concerning the qualification and 
disciplinary punishment of the public servants". The same law concerns 
the appointment of staff on a basis of specific qualifications such as 
university degrees and success in examination. However political 
conflicts and rivalries caused replacement of the law by the subsequent 
laws AOIIA/1887 and AQII71890, which generated a smoother operation 
of the public services.
At the beginnings of the 20th century other laws were enacted 
concerning the tenure of public servants who had served for fifteen years, 
and "Disciplinary Committees" were established in the various Ministries. 
This had the effect of reducing the arbitrary power of the Ministers over 
the public servants. Furthermore, after the Goudi revolution in 1909, a 
series of laws were enacted in relation to public administration. 
According to these laws, employees in certain administrative areas were
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recruited after taking examinations. Yet, public servants' career 
development was a concern of committees that were established precisely 
for this reason. However it was the Revised Constitution of 1911 which 
put an end to the uncertainty of public servants, stating the public 
servants would become "constitutionally permanent."
The Constitutional Revision of 1911 was a remarkable stage in the 
history of the G.P.A. Since then no other constitutions regulation has 
taken place; as far as the G.P.A. is concerned; while changes in the 
G.P.A. enforced by general laws, the "Public Servants' Code" prevailed. 
The first Public Servants' Code was published in 1951 (1811/15-5-1951), 
based on informations taken by the French service code of 1946, the 
German service code of 1923, some Italian laws of 1923 and British laws 
concerning Public Administration. (Another point which supports what 
has been mentioned above, that is to say, the influence of Western 
administrative culture on the G.P.A.) This 'Code' constituted the 
fundamental law for the public servants and the basic line for the 
evolution of the G.P.A. institutions. However, under new needs, claims, 
and demands of public servants there were a large number of violations 
of the "Code" which resulted in reducing the respect and commitment of 
public servants to the "Code". During the seven years of dictatorship 
(1967-1974) the "Code" suffered many alterations. It was, however, 
abolished in 1974 by the post-dictatorship government.
Finally a new Code was enacted in 1977 (NA611/1977) which 
remains valid today (1990), which however is in doubt inasmuch as it
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does not correspond to the recent social, economic and technological 
conditions.
Substantial alterations were tried in the G.P.A. after 1981 when 
the "nAZOK" government was in power. These alterations concerned the 
career development of public servants (N. 1586/1986), the payment scale 
(N. 1505/1984), but also alterations in the leadership of the Ministries 
with the establishment of positions such as Secretary Generals and 
Secretary "Specialists" burdened with administrative responsibilities, 
which, however, constituted political positions rather than administrative 
ones. Yet, there were changes in the "Official and Disciplinary 
Committees", in order to become more representative for public servants 
and entertain the idea of public servants' participation.
Nevertheless, the administrative crisis which is confirmed daily 
along with the desperate efforts for radical alterations which the new 
government in power made, prove that the legal regulations for the 
G.P.A. were not fruitful.
Besides the several changes in the administrative laws and the 
administrative status of public servants throughout the last two 
centuries, there have been several structural changes in the G.P.A. since 
it was first established under the decree of 3-15-1833. The G.P.A. as 
has already been mentioned was characterized by centralization. Since 
it was established, there were some attempts at decentralization, 
especially after World War II, when the geographical units into which the 
State had been divided by the decree of 3-15-1833 obtained a sort of
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administrative independence for certain activities. Despite the 
advantages of decentralization, however, the G.P.A. did not manage to 
set in full motion this institution throughout the years. Indeed it still 
remains tightly centralized.
In conclusion, I would note that the history of the G.P.A. provides 
many warnings to Greek society which could make us to avoid the 
repetition of past faults. However, these warnings do not seem to be 
given the significance that they deserve. Consequently they do not 
become the guide-lines for the further development of the G.P.A. This 
refusal to leam  from history and past mistakes illustrates Crozier's 
(1964) view that "bureaucracies are the organisations which never leam  
from their errors."
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n .4  C onclusion
The G.P.A., undoubtedly bureaucratic, seems to be based on a 
contradiction. Although it adopts bureaucratic strategies and structures 
which imply impersonality and impartiality the G.P.A. operates in a 
particular partial way in the sense that it seems to be affected 
significantly by the political party in power. That is to say, the 
administrative procedures appear to be underpinned by the Political will.
This relation of the G.P.A. with Politics appears to have its roots 
in the conditions of the establishment of the G.P.A. The adventurous 
history of the Greek state throughout the years is depicted in the 
operation of the Greek bureaucracy. The influence of Western 
administrative culture on the G.P.A. which had a distinctive socio­
economic background led to a deformity of the administrative system  
from the beginning. In addition, in their struggle for the possession of 
authority the various social classes used the G.P.A. as a means to achieve 
their aims. The system of Political clientism and patronage was located 
at that time and since then it became the nightmare of the G.P.A. and 
at the same time the determinant element of its operation.
All the bureaucratic procedures, as will be presented analytically 
in the next chapter, are used in such a way as to serve the interests of 
individuals or particular groups while overlaid under the principles of 
equality and impartiality that bureaucracy provides. Public servants, 
however, although they are required to be merely executors, do not avoid
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involvement in this game which takes place every day in the G.P.A. 
Therefore as future chapters will elaborate they respond with apathy and 
emotional withdrawal from work while trying to prove themselves by 
involvement in informal activities and by forming groups which have 
politics as reference points. This tendency will be considered later in 
relation to the social culture in chapter 5.
In conclusion it can be observed that the G.P.A. although, 
according to Greek constitution, is supposed legally to be a neutral 
bureaucratic organisation which exists in order to serve the common 
interest, in fact is the subject of political power. The term "'rousphetV' 
which gives the title to the next chapter describes these practices of 
Political intervention in certain bureaucratic procedures.
— 8 1 ”
Chapter HI: 'Houspheti” 
III 1. Introduction
Having examined the prevailing theories of bureaucracy and the 
specific context of the G.P.A., this chapter focuses upon actual practices 
of the G.P.A. In particular it demonstrates how bureaucratic principles 
are often shaped by Political values and priorities. In Greece the 
pervasiveness of Political influence is described in the term ''Rouspheti,'* 
Thus, "'rousphetV' describes a series of practices in the G.P.A. which 
impact on employees throughout their working lives either to their 
benefit or to their disadvantage.
This chapter therefore deals with this term and highlights the 
bureaucratic procedures which are affected by it. In this and the 
following two chapters, quotations are used from my own research into 
three Greek organisations. My research findings are drawn on 
selectively to illustrate the key issues surrounding the routine practice 
of "rousphetV' in the G.P.A.
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III.2 "Rousphetr -  p olitical involvem ent versus 
im personality
As has already been mentioned in the historical development of the 
G.P.A. (chapter two) "rouspheti" is the result of the Political clientelistic 
relationships which emerged soon after the G.P.A. was created. Scholars, 
practitioners but also politicians and citizens attribute to '^rousphetV' 
most if not all the evils of the disorganisation of the G.P.A. The use of 
''rousphetV' tends to be treated as a "natural" set of practices which are 
often taken for granted and therefore left unquestioned.
It seems to confirm the popular saying which states "if you have 
the knife you will eat the melon." In this sense "rouspheti" is interpreted 
in a positive way by those who gain from it. Indeed it becomes a source 
of pride for those who can use it inasmuch as it provides them with an 
important means of power. Those who are excluded from those 
conditions of power, tend to react not by citicising this kind of strategy 
but by attempting to find similar sources for themselves to depend upon.
"The inexorable logic of "rousphetV' always prevails" remarks the 
magazine Public Sector in January 1990 in an article about the G.P.A. 
That every administrative procedure can be influenced by "rouspheti" is 
highlighted by Laertes, the trade unionist, a member of the central 
committee of public servants' trade union (AAEAY). In the following 
statement Laertes echoes the views of many of any respondents:
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"It is "rouspheti" which is necessary for somebody to be 
appointed, "rouspheti" to take the desirable post in the 
office, "rouspheti" to be promoted and take a managerial 
position.
This quotation emphasises how employees' formal life is greatly 
dependent on their Political connections. It also implies that Politics are 
embedded in formal procedures. Therefore since "rouspheti" is already 
established, it is never eliminated following the user in all stages of his 
or her formal life afterwards. The extent to which "rouspheti" is used is 
described by C. Woodhouse (1990), another of the biography of the Greek 
President K. Karamanlis. He writes in a recent article about the 'Greek
psyche*:  its use (of rouspheti) is so common that it caused me no
surprise some years ago to be approached in the street by a distinguished 
General with a request for a rather delicate "rouspheti" Nowadays, 
because I wrote a biography of Karamanlis, I am often accused of 
possessing unlimited influence. More than one Greek has rung me up 
from Athens, with requests that I should approach the President on their 
behalf."
However, once people have accepted the logic of "rouspheti" they 
are not content with "delicate" ones. They sometimes cry for the moon, 
backed by their politicians' clientelsitic disposal which never denies 
anything, even if the requirement is illegal. This is highlighted by 
Hector, a manager who because of his position receives such requests.
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"Every day, people come to may office, sent by politicians 
whose party is in power. THiey ask for things to be done 
which run either counter to the law or are impossible. 
However, clearly expressed is my refusal to satisfy those 
requests, Tm not believed. The discussion usually ends up 
with something like: "ok, I’ll ask my politician to phone you 
up and I’m sure, then, you will find a way to do what you 
now refuse." "I’m fed up," Hector continues, "trying to 
uphold the power of the law and the regulations".
An example of illegal demand was given by Ulysses, a Director, who
describes in a very disappointed manner the rooted mentality of Greeks
about "rouspheti."
"One day, a lady came to my office whose son had sat for 
the Panhellenic exams* and the results he got didn’t allow 
him to enter the University or TE.I. The lady, however, 
wanted him enrolled perhaps not at the University if that 
was "too much", as she said, but at least, at TE.I. However 
clearly I explained to her that her requirement was not 
only obviously illegal but also impossible, as the lists with 
the students who had passed were publicly available, she 
Insisted that she had been told by her "patron polititician** 
that her requirement could be satisfied. How can we plan 
changes in the G.P.A. and society in general when people 
think the way the lady does?" he ended up.
However it is rather unlikely that officials who comply with such a 
request would reveal it. Moreover, there are quite a number of 
employees who do not share the view that their organisational behaviour 
must be characterized by impariality. Thus, besides using "rouspheti" for
* The Panhellenic examinations take place once a year and all the
candidates for University or TE.I. paticipate. The insitution has a strong 
reputation for objectivity, fairness and impartiality.
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their own development in the G.P.A. they also operate with a 
personalized and highly subjective set of practices. Artemis, a clerical 
public servant describes the partiality inherent in public servants' 
functioning.
"Unfortunately personal feelings interfere in the choice and 
priority of several of the matters we have to deal with. If 
something concerns a friend or an acquaintance or a 
political friend, we try to push the matter forward 
favourably while for those we don't know or have a conflict 
with, we delay, or put the matter into a drawer for a long 
time".
This quotation reveals that "rouspheti" works at all hierarchical levels in
the G.P.A. while the other side of the same coin reveals resistance, by
neglecting cases or "putting them into the drawer" for a long time.
Public servants are pushed into such actions mostly by their political
convictions, to such an extent that a great many procedures are delayed
and plans fail. Agamemnon, an ex-top manager (Secretary "Specialist")
explained precisely this point:
"Political allegiance of public servants is so intense as to 
set up barriers to the pushing forward of a policy and to 
the establishing of insitutions".
There are, however, justifications of "why" "roupsheti" and Political 
intervention exists. It has already been mentioned that specifically for 
Greece there were historical factors which allowed its development. 
Moreover the idea of "rouspheti" has a more general derivation. It seems 
to be the response of Politics to the bureaucrats' power of knowledge. 
This view is stated cirtically by Clegg (1990). He introduces "rouspheti"; 
although without using pecisely this word, as a means of control; a
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means which allows Political masters to “divide and rule." According to 
him, favouritism and such like interventions which advantage a certain 
group of individuals enable Political mastery to defend their power from 
the dangerously increased power of knowledge of the bureaucrats. 
Tsoukalas (1987) also considers the tradition of "rouspheti" as a 
deliberate Political choice so that Political control can be achieved. These 
findings appear to support Crozier's (1964) analysis of French 
bureaucracies. According to him, impersonality leads to the weakening 
of superiors' power over subordinates, inasmuch as everything about 
subordinates' formal life is precisely defined by impersonal rules and 
therefore leaves no space for personal interventions. However, as Crozier 
believes, impersonality also weakens the bargaining power of 
subordinates.
I would therefore argue that "rouspheti" overcomes this kind of 
weakness caused by impersonality providing supervisor with the power 
for control on the one hand and bargaining power to subordinates on the 
other. One must not forget that subordinates' bargaining power relies on 
the possession of knowledge the administrative secret and the control of 
files. The bargaining power of employees, in the G.P.A. seems to have 
developed through the relationship of informal groups with Political 
forces on one hand, and the formal organisation on the other. This 
phenomenon, however, will be considered later in the context of 
organisational culture.
-8 7 -
From the foregoing analysis "rouspheti" and political intervention 
seem to be incorporated into the techniques used for the maintenance of 
Political power and subsequent control over pubhc administration. 
(Etzoni-Hale»y 1979) However, while Clegg (1990) seems to put the 
beginning of this interrelationship some time after the bureaucratic 
relationship has been established (when the bureaucrats already serve 
the system), I would put this at the outset, from the moment a vacant 
position is advertized. From experience I know that candidates for a 
position use Political interference in order to speed up selection 
procedures. Indeed, selection procedures are the first place for 
"rouspheti" and political interference as well.
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m .3 Selection
The recruitment of employees is characterized by a great diversity 
of practices. This is because of the politicization of selection which 
requires selectors to excersize their discretion within the process. Until 
1983 public servants were recruited on the basis of competitive 
examinations. (Spiliopoulos 1984). In, 1983 under the law 1320 public 
servants started to be selected according to "social criteria." The law 
required the processing of candidates’ applications by computer in, order 
to ensure impariality and objectivity. This law has been used only once 
since it came into effect. Recently, in 1987, a new law on recruitment in 
the G.P.A. was enacted but, as yet, it has never been used.
The original selection system was based on the arbitrary 
disposition of King and Ministers, as revealed by the history of the 
G.P.A. The implementation of such a system was detrimental to the 
further operation of the G.P.A. in so far as it created "rouspheti" and 
established an appropriate framework for Political intervention.
The logic of this system is what Jefferson, the Amercian President, 
converted into a moral principle: "To the victors, the spoils."
Recruitment therefore, with spoil system supplied the Political power of 
the day with obedient and unquestioning personnel, bound by a chain of 
mutual obligation and therefore ready to serve the interests of its 
Political masters. (Elzioni-Halevy 1979)
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This perception appears to be rooted in Greek public servants, and
it is highlighted by Laertes, the trade unionist:
"I believe that the Public Administration has been seen as 
the booty of the election winner, especially in Greece. The 
problem of Political interference is an old one but 
unfortunately is still there".
This quotation implies that although the legislation on recruitment has
evolved over the years, the basic tendency of Politics to influence the
G.P.A is still dominant. This is also remarked by Dr. Th. Katsanevas, a
member of the executive committee of IIASOK, who underlines the
potential of 'Vouspheti'' in relation to recruitment.
"Recruitment based on "'rousphetV' constituted and still 
constitutes a powerful means of Political control" (Publie 
Sector)
Yet, S. Flogaitis (1987), focusing on the same point says:
"The electoral clientelism is the only method for 
recruitment in the G.P.A." (p.53)
E. Etzioni-Hsdevy (1979) presents clearly how the mechanism of 
selection works when public services are characterized by a great 
politicization: "... the introduction of political appointees into public 
administration makes it possible for the rulling party to utilize its 
influence in the administration to hand out a wide array of additional 
rewards by political criteria. In other words, whenever public servants 
owe their appointments to political qualifications, they are likely to be 
under strong pressure (as well as being highly motivated) to aid in 
perpetuating the power of their patron party. They will usually do so by
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allocating whatever rewards they have at their disposal in return for
electoral support for the party The politicization of the public service
may thus serve as the basis of a ’spoil system' whose fruit may benefit
large numbers of the party's potential supporters at the poll and penalize
large number of non-supporters." (p. 119)
However, the extent of the politicians' tendency to provide
positions for their political friends is particularly illustrated by a saying
which is attributed to the former Prime Minister A. Papandreou. He
appears to say: '
"If I left it up to them (his Ministers) they would appoint 
the whole of Greece within a week", (article by M. Ploritis 
in To Vima 10-6-1990),
Such a system naturally does not require to be designed or programmed.
On the contrary, properly-designed selection system prevent the "free-
hunting" of positions by candidates while preventing politicians from
expressing their appreciation to their supporters by granting them
positions in the G.P.A.
The results of this selection system is that the G.P.A. is staffed by
inappropriate personnel often incapable of performing their duties. As
long as merit does not underlie recruitment it would seem that
employees' capability relies on other criteria such as Political affiliation.
"For us (the Greeks), only the masters of the political party 
are "capable" and only the strong supporters of the political 
party are "experienced."
remarks H. Ploritis in his article in the newspaper in (To Vima 10 -6 -
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1990). Such personnel due to mutual obligation are very vulnerable to 
political influence.
This is the beginning of an interdependence where employees 
become heavily dependent on the Political party in power (which 
substantialy appointed them) while the Political party in power relies on 
employees (whom it appointed for its succesful management). As long as 
this mutually beneficial relationship works, public administration is 
likely to be productive and efficient to the extent that the appointed 
personnel are of good quality, something which seems difficult given the 
means of selection. Conversely, some personnel may be incapable of 
achieving any goals even if the relationship of interdependence works. 
The result would then be inefficiency for the Public Administration.
However, the implemented selection system under law 1320/1983, 
although objective in the sense that it treated all candidates in the same 
way, was not meritocratic. The criteria it set such as age, number of 
children, participation of the candidate or his or her parents in the 
National Resistance, were not the ones which could assure the 
recruitment of adequate and capable personnel. Rather, a set of criteria 
was established to solve the problem of unemployment, using the G.P.A. 
as the area which could best absorb the work force.
Although this system met with public servants' approval since it 
was widely perceived as facilitating objectivity, it was later withdrawn. 
In fact, it suffered from two weaknesses. It provided neither high quality 
personnel nor supporters of the Party in power. A subsequent system
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under law 1735/1987 tried to improve on the previous one by simply
adding more criteria concerning the educational level of candidates.
However, this law has never been used despite the fact that it effectively
prevents Political interference. This has been enough to condemn the
system to non-use, especially in a period during which the unstable
Political situation makes frequent general elections more likely. For
instance, it emerges that last year 100,000 candidates were recruited by
the Public Sector in complete violation of the law. This is illustrated by
Laertes the trade unionist:
"... during the pre-election period 100,000 people were 
employed by the Public Administration without the 
government bothering to use the law it had enacted".
As a consequence, some employees do not have the requisite
qualifications, a point highlighted by Orestes, another trade unionist in
the central committee of the public servants’ trade union. He considers
the majority of employees to be the product of ''rouspheti" and therefore
"they lack whatever the required qualifications are for the 
service. They don't have any formal or substantial 
qualifications to cope with the subject of their work and 
they also lack knowldge in general. They don't have any 
imagination and they don't have the background to let 
them move on other kinds of knowledge".
These personnel are not only dependent and easily manipulated but also
avoid innovations because of their lack of knowledge, which then leads
them to a technique of "self-protection from and resistance to changes of
any kind. Thus they often become untrust-worthy officials.
The selection for top managerial positions entails even more 
Political interference than the selection of other personnel. In fact the
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top administrative positions, such as Secretary General, have become
absolute Political positions and the appointees although usually w ell-
qualified are selected solely on the basis of their political convictions.
The number of 'Political officials" appointed to the top of the
administrative hierarchy increased the years of IIASOK's power thus,
ensuring greater Political control over the G.P.A. (A. Makridimitris 1990)
The only selection system so far devised that seems to be trusted
and appreciated by public servants was the one based on a combination
of formal qualifications and success m written examinations. This
system, according to the views of public servants was the only one which
supplied the G.P.A. with highly-qualified personnel while ignoring
candidates Political convictions. Pares, a higher-ranked public servant,
illustrates this point, he himself being a product of this system.
"We were appointed after we got the exams which were as 
clear as crystal. We didn't ask for any Political support.
To prove that. I’ll tell you that all of us appointed at that 
time (1976) supported the opposite political party from the 
one in power. If one looks at those people who were 
employed after having taken the exams, and compares 
them to the "others", one will realise what a difference 
there is".
Achilles, a manager with 25 years experience, supports 
Pares statement: "There is an obvious qualitative
difference between the employees who were appointed after 
they had taken exams and those who were appointed by 
favourtism without following any procedure".
Many research respondents shared the above view about the selection 
system by examinations. They seemed to trust it and consider it the 
system which allows the minimum Political intervention; i.e. "pure" 
bureaucratic princples working effectively! However, the answer to the
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question why this system was no longer valid is a simple one:
"...it didn't allow much Political involvement"
as Patroclus, a university-qualified and high-ranked public servant 
stated.
Therefore selection procedures produce another paradox. Political 
power influences the selection of employees and uses it as a means to 
control the G.P.A. However, this has a detrimental effect on the 
operation of the G.P.A. as the recruited personnel are unable to 
correspond with the duties they were appointed for as they were selected 
on a basis of non-merit. In this sense, the Political power which 
influenced the selection can not, actually, rely on the personnel it has 
recruited. It might assure the allegiance of this personnel but not their 
efficient performance, as selection not based on merit provides personnel 
of low quality. Nevertheless, despite this paradox, (which has been 
conceived by the Political powers in Greece), the same strategy continues 
to be applied. It seems to be more important for Politics to control 
bureaucracies than to achieve and maximize efficiency.
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in.4. Employees' allocation-m oving
What all the studies and articles about the G.P.A. highlight is the 
non-rational allocation of employees to various positions within the 
Service. It is widely argued that the majority of employees possess their 
positions because of their connections with the leadership, or because 
they managed to influence the decision about their placement through 
Political channels. This can result in some interrelated problems. 
Employees are appointed, who are not competent, and or are merely 
favoured by selection. Equally, too few or too many employees are 
appointed to particular departments.
In seeking to challenge and overcome these selection-allocation 
problems, the current Minister of the Présidence of the Government, who 
is responsible for the G.P.A. has began to try to monitor more closely 
routine practices in the G.P.A. For example, he has required statistical 
breakdowns of the staff in all public services. Unfortunately some public 
servants seems unwilling to cooperate. Others did not have the basic 
information required.
It would appear that there are offices and services which require 
fifteen persons to run effectively which are staffed with only five 
employees, while others which require five, are staffed with, fifteen. 
This is reported by Kalypso, a high-ranking public servant, who, 
however, avoids naming the services or the offices she refers to, 
protecting either the colleagues who work there or herself. Achilles, a
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manager, also supports her claim connecting it with favouritism in 
selection. However, in order to manipulate the placement of personnel 
every Minister neeeds the assistance of managers or superiors. Thus, 
the non-rational allocation of employees involved a "fruitful" 
interdépendance between superiors and Political forces. That, in turn, 
along with a number of other factors, explains why the first concern of 
every government is to change the high-ranking administrative staff 
(Magazine "Public Sector" January 1990).
Moreover, the non-rational allocation seems to be affected by 
employees' tenure. Until 1911, when tenure for pubHc servants was 
established every governmental change entailed dismissal of all those 
public servants who were supporters of the previous party in power, to 
be replaced by supporters of the new one. The myth of Klathmonos 
square* required replacement of all public servants. (Tsoukalas 1986).
After tenure had been established and the dismissal of personnel 
was no longer a possibility, the accumulation of employees in several 
offices started. Inevitably, numbers grew fastest in those departments 
most easily manipulated by Political forces, and those where employees 
were least likely to resist political appointees. This trend, continuing to 
the present day, is for departments to be filled with staff who are 
inappropriately qualified. This strategy is helped by the criteria set by 
the law about recruitment. (Any university degree seems 
* In this square, it is said all the dismissed employees gathered together 
and cried when they found themselves unemployed.
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to be adequate or sufficient for any position, except where specific
technical knowledge is required (N. 1735/1987). Therefore it is not
surprising if the superior of a purely administrative department is an
economist while the superior of the economic department is a law
graduate official. This particular phenomenon is illustrated by
Patroclus, a high-ranking public servant and supervisor, who had a
degree in economics:
"I hold a post irrelevant to the economic studies I have 
done, and so, I have never practiced what I was (qualified 
in."
This quotation indicates that employees' allocation is either accidental or 
enforced by external factors. It also explains to a degree why the quality 
of service proovided by the G.P.A. is too low. It seems to be the 
consequence of a non-rational use of personnel.
The non-rational allocation of employees is the current concern of 
the Greek government and also of the public servants' trade union. The 
latter realized that over-staffing threatens not only the social status of 
the G.P.A. but also hinders the struggle for improvement of working 
conditions and the achievement of decent pay. Public opinion of public 
servants is low, because they are seen to be occupying desks and chairs 
without, however, presenting a "spectatcular" productivity. 
(Athanasopoulos 1983).
Besides staff recruitment and appointment in the G.P.A., 
"rouspheti" and Political interference are involved in employees' transfers 
either from position to position in the same service or in another service
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or in another city. I could argue that this procedure in particular is very 
sensitive to Political manipulation, the more so since established tenure 
removed the weapon of dismissal.
The fear of the employee, mentioned in the introduction of being 
interviewed, along with the statement she made: "I don't want to move 
to another city..." show that transfer has become the new "weapon" in 
the hands of Political masters. Employees' transfers, therefore, operates 
either as a reward for those committed to and supportive of the Party in 
power or as a punishment for opposition. This is highlighted by Electra, 
a clerical public servant who herself was subject to such punishment:
"I, myself, was moved from one workplace to another 
because of my Political convictions. Besides the moving I 
had to face not only the hositlity of my colleagues but I 
have, also, been actively prosecuted."
Hector, a manager who has, however, been reinstated after a recent
governmental change, had the same experience. He, in addition, put
forward another issue related to the transfer of employees because of
their Political views:
"What happens when a victim of "rouspheti" is reinstated 
especially in a position which bears authority?"
He wonders if it is a matter of morality to seek revenge on those who
contributed to his transfer:
"Tm not going to take revenge now that I'm 
reinstated and powerful." he states.
His quotation shows the extent of the psychological problems 
caused by a transfer for Political reasons.
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Another high-ranking employee, Jokasta, describes here own 
experience with transfer. She herslef was not threatened with transfer 
to another office, but her brother, who had been working in the same 
M inistiy was. She believes that this action was due to her Political 
views and he participation in the activities of the employees' trade union.
However, because she is protected in a way, by the fact that she is an 
active trade unionist but, also, an excellent official, the only way harm 
could be done to her was through the transfer of her brother. Therefore, 
she was very depressed and disappointed as having been working 
productively and loyally for years in the G.P.A., now "she was paid off 
this way."
The transfer has further consequences. Personnel, especially in
managerial positions, revealed a psychological insecurity which prevented
them from acting constructively or planninig in the long term. This is
illustrated by Achilles, a manager.
"Although my position is not a Political one, I don't know 
if on Monday I will hold the same post. That, to a degree, 
depends on who the Minister is."
(This interview was held two days before the general election in
November 1989). However, not only the managers have psychological
problems with transfer. There are also subordinates who even if they
do not experience such a procedure themselves, may experience a change
of colleagues especially changes of supervisors and managers. Every so
often they find themselves in the situation of coping with supervisors
who have a hostile attitude because of their transfer to positions they did
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not want, or supervisors who are discontented for the same reason.
This is highlighted by Hera, a high-ranking public servant:
"We, the senior public servants, have always been anxious.
How are they (she implies the transferred superiors) going 
to face us? What are they going to be told? Is each one 
of us to have a "good morning" from the new supervisor?
How is she/he going to be treated? The experience of such 
changes is appalling. We are always under stress and 
anxiety."
Both procedures analyzed above illustrate their degree of 
interrelation with Politics, The latter especially displays the tendency 
of Political power to control the bureaucratic process by attacking its 
several aspects. The important thing is that when for some reason a 
bureaucratic procedure does not leave space for Political involvement, 
Political power shifts to another one. For example, when tenure was 
established. Political power shifted to the transfer procedure. What is 
obvious is the tendency of Political power to interfere in every 
bureaucratic activity.
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III.5. Prom otion -  appraisal system
Firstly, I must distinguish between two promotion procedures. 
One as referred to as promotion in the hierarchy (ranks A, B, F, A) while 
the other is referred to as promotion to certain positions such as 
manager. For both procedures the decision about promotion is taken by 
the "Official Council" of the Ministry or the specific service and according 
to the law it (the Official Council) must be composed of five members of 
whom three are appointed by the Minister whereas the other two are 
elected by the personnel. The composition of the Council allows plenty 
of room for Political intervention and "rouspheti".
This fact is reinforced by the way the appraisal system works. 
Following the bureaucratic idea, the law has specified certain 
prerequisites for public servants' promotion. Both seniority and good 
organisational behaviour described on appraisal reports drawn up by 
superiors, are taken into account. The appraisal report concerns pubHc 
servants' productivity, willingness to undertake initiatives, acceptance of 
responsibility, committment, morality and the hke. The system  
presupposes that the employee is supervised in his or her performance 
and that the appraisal report formulated by the superior will be based on 
fairness and objectivity.
The appraisal system seems to allow personal interference and 
therefore gives power to the superiors concerned. It follows that 
subordinates ought to be dependent on their superiors, as they will
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presumably affect their careers.
However, my findings show that subordinates do not feel any kind
of dependence on their superiors for this reason. They do not pay any
particular attention to the "appraisal reports" as they do not consider
them as influencing their career development. This belief in turn causes
a slowdown in their performance, as they take for granted that they will
be promoted regardless of their performance. Hecuba, a clerical public
servant, highlights this belief:
"Anyway I'll climb up the ranks regardless of whether I'm 
hard-working or not. How my official report sounds is 
neither here nor there to me. I would appreciate it though 
if my performance was appraised rationally."
Nevertheless, although an unfair apraisal does not affect employees'
career development, it does affect employees' psychological situations,
pushing them further towards uncommitted behaviour or psychological
withdrawal from their work, in two ways. For those who work
productively, an appraisal report identical with that of a colleague who
does the bare minimum generates intense feelings of disappointment
because of such unfairness. (F. Hefron 1989). To those, on the other
hand, who are unconcerned such an appraisal report generates a feeling
of complacency and increases their tendency to indifference. (F. Hefron
1989). This point is illustrated by Polyxena, a clerical public servant:
"Whatever their performance, all employees have almost 
identical appraisal reports and they are given promotions.
It annoys me, as in the past I used to collaborate with 
people who did nothing. The promotion system is not fair.
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All the employees are appraised the same way while some 
of them are not performing at all...but they get promotion 
exactly the same as the employees who work very hard and 
struggle with their work."
Highly subjective appraisal reports tend to be unworthy and valueless.
There are a great number of employees such as Pares, a high-ranking
official, who believes that the appraisal reports express their superior's
philanthropic wishes rather than their judgement of the subordinates'
organisational behaviour. Pares sees the appraisal procedure as
operating like this:
"..can I give Alexis A and Manolis B? No,...it's impossible, 
although the difference between them is clear. So, I'll give 
A to everybody, and then everybody has A and everybody 
seems to be excellent and so who is going to be the 
superior?"
This quotation touches the point on which Political intervention relies.
The plethora of excellent identical appraisal reports is ripe ground for 
the growth of favouritism and "rouspheti". Discretion is left to the 
Political masters to fill crucial posts with its own people. This way of 
promotion to managerial posts leads to numerous reactions either by 
candidates for these positions or by subordinates.
Firstly, antagonism develops between the prospective candidates. 
Secondly, the candidates who were excluded from holding a 
position while estimating themselves as capable of doing so start to 
question their superior's official status and consequently their superior's 
judgement and power. The feelings which are generated by such a 
situation are described by Pares, who does not hide his bitterness at
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having experienced antagonism for years and having been unfairly 
apraised.
"...who is going to judge whether you do or do not deserve 
to be promoted, or to estimate your performance?"
Nevertheless, managers' views about the appraisal system do not seem
to be much different from those analyzed. However, they do seek to
justify the development of the strategy which they follow.
They ascribe their flexibility to the difficulty of measuring
performance because of the lack of good clarity. This point is supported
by F Heffron (1989): "The problem with measuring public sector
productivity begins with attempting to "specify the output of public
organisations. The lack of good clarity chracteristic of public
oranisations makes even identification of outputs difficult."
Another point the manager makes is that the appraisal process is
neglected by superiors (Minister, Secretary General). That, therefore,
establishes a kind of strategy wich starts from the top of the hierarchy.
It is Achilles, a manager, who states:
"An appraisal report hasn't been drawn up for me for the 
last seven or eight years. I don't care what happens as
long as it doesn't affect my career development. The
appraisal reports which are made are nothing but a parody 
and this is ridiculous for the instituion. How can you 
judge your subordinates' productivity when you have not 
been judged by somebody else?"
Achilles' quotation provides a justification which converts a clear- 
cut bureaucratic process, as is appraisal, to a moral problem for
managers. On the same basis, however, Menelaus, a personnel
manager, recognises the highly subjective nature of appraisal, when he
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states:
"My judgement is not objective as my supervisor's 
judgement is not objective. We are accustomed to 
appraising all employees' work performances more 
genereously than, in fact, they deserve. Thus, the good 
employee is usually estimated as perfect, the bad one as 
moderate and as for the moderate he is judged as good.
As far as the drawing up of appraisal reports is concerned, 
it is a matter of routine and nothing more... In this way 
I, myself, contribute negatively to the G.P.A. operation."
This quotation implies that the appraisal system is often perceived
to be unfair towards they productive workers and is therefore simply an
emotional issue within the organisation. Yet, equally, it highlights the
low value of appraisal reports and the poor contribution of the appraisal
system to the administrative process and to the motivation of employees.
Yet, both quotations reveal that the managers do not consider the
appraisal system as a means of power and control although it is a basic
factor in employees' career development. Therefore, the bureaucratic
procedure which is a source of power for managers and supervisors,
especially because it allows personal interference in employees' career
development, in practice appears not to give them any particular power.
On the other hand, if one returns to the subordinates' quotation,
it is clear that employees do not seem to feel any sort of dependence on
their superiors because of the authority they have to appraise their
performance.
I would attribute this phenomenon to Political interference which 
runs counter to Crozier's finding, according to which it is impersonality 
that weakens superiors' power and subordinates' bargaining power.
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Political intervention in employee promotion to high-ranking hierarchical 
positions established an "unwritten" rule which leads to the idea that 
promotion does not rely on appraisal but on Political connections. That 
in turn reduces the value of the appraisal system which becomes simply 
"a matter of routine", while the superiors responsible for appraising 
employee performance react more like Samaritans than like powerful 
officials.
And that is the end and the beginning at the same time of a 
vicious circle, as the identical appraisal reports increase the Political 
intervention while reducing further the value of appraisal and the
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superiors' control through it. j
in.6. Conclusion
This chapter has suggested that the bureaucratic procedures of the 
G.P.A. such as selection or promotion are often characterized by Political 
inrtervention.
As a consequence, equal treatment among employees but also 
clients is not established. Furthermore, selection based on non- 
meritocratic criteria provides the G.P.A. with inappropriate personnel 
and thus generates suitable conditions for the development of 
inefficiency. The tendency to inefficiency is reinforced by the non- 
rational and favouritistic allocation of employees transfers or changes to 
opponents of the Political party in power and finally promotion and filling 
of crucial administrative positions based on 'Youspheti" and nepotism.
''Rouspheti" therefore and the Political involvement it implies, 
seem to destroy the myth of neutrality of the G.P.A. They also indicate 
that bureaucracies must be restructured as far as their organisational 
performance is concerned, as they neither secure the promise of equality 
of treatment nor efficiency.
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CHAPTER IV : M anagerial Control and Labour R esistance -  The 
Greek version.
IV. 1. Introduction
The previous chapter explored the influence of "rousphetV' on 
selection. This chapter presents a broader analysis of the way that 
Politics also dominates the basic organisational function which is 
"control". Already the background is made by selecting for managerial 
positions preferred officials. The next stage, then, for Politics is to 
inspire or to enforce the form of control exercised over employees.
This chapter, approaches the issue of control by examining the 
extent to which bureaucratic organisation is in fear of managerial 
control. After a general discussion of control in organisations, the 
chapter enquires in detail into the G.P.A. drawing upon the research 
findings and considers to what extent management seeks and is able to 
control the organisation. It, also, examines the forms of control applied 
and the resistance or the resentment which arises amongst employees.
Recent writings on the labour process (Thompson 1983, Edwards 
1979) have illustrated the interrelation between control and resistance 
in organisations. Accordingly, the final section of this chapter considers 
trade unionism in the G.P.A. as an important response to quite rigid 
managerial control.
The theme of this chapter reinforces the overall perspective of the
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thesis which highlights the way that Political involvement taints or 
corrupts organisational practices within the G.P.A. Managerial control, 
therefore, is examined in this chapter in order to demonstrate how 
bureaucracy can be manipulated in practice and how large is the gap 
between typical models of bureaucracy and particular organisation 
practices.
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IV.2. The nature of management control.
The concept of control may be interpreted in a number of different 
ways with varying connotations. Rathe (1960) has listed some 57 
varieties ranking from "prohibit" to "manipulate".
Within organisation studies control has become a controversial 
issue. It is connected with a number of positive functions such as 
predictability, order, reliability and stability. It is, however, connected 
with domination, coercion, exploitation and manipulation, as well. 
Absence of control in the first case entails anarchy, chaos, disorder and 
uncertainty while in the second case it leads to freedom, individuality, 
discretion, responsibility and autonomy. (D. Buchanan and A. Huczynski 
1985).
Nevertheless, control is an important managerial feature (Mullin 
1985,1989). Indeed, under the torchlight of critical perspectives it is the 
core of conceptualizations of management (Reed 1989). Different 
approaches to management or to organisational theories have interpreted 
control in different ways.
According to Mullin (1985, 1989) there are four different 
approaches to control,
1. The classical approach, which focuses on organisations as structures 
with formal procedures, that is to say it puts emphasis on the technical 
requirements of the organisation, and it considers control as the
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necessary element for efficiency. Underlined by the imiversalistic 
aspirations of classical management theory, the technical perspective 
analyzing management focuses, also, on the structure as the formal 
mechanism "for co-ordinating and controlling task performance on a 
rational and continuous basis." (Reed 1989, p.3).
2. The human relation approach which puts emphasis on the social 
organisation, the social needs of the members of the organisation, sees 
control as self-defeating, as it can cause employee resistance.
3. The open systems model sees control as the "inter-relationship 
among inputs, outputs and the series of activities which lead to the 
outputs." (Mullin 1985, 1989 p. 460) while
4. In the contingency approach which advocates that "there is no one, 
best structure" control is a matter of contingency of the situation. In 
numerous organisational studies control has been considered, usually 
from different perspectives. Thus, control has been examined in relation 
to power and influence. Tannenbaum for instance, defines control as 
"any process by which a person or group determines (i.e. "intentionally 
affects") the behaviour of another person or group, in other words, causes 
someone else to do what they want them to do." (Tannenbaum 1962 in 
D. Pugh, S. Hickson, G. Hinings 1983 p.79) While D. Cherrington (1989) 
confronts control as the "epitome of influence" (p.727).
Control has been referred to in organisational theories with regard 
to authority. (Blau and Scott 1962) According to Blau "authority is 
deemed necessary for co-ordinating and controlling large organisations."
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(Blau 1964, p.222). Efficiency is also interrelated with control (Arrow 
1964). Furthermore, it is often a concept of a control viewed in 
conjunction with employees' emotional well-being and satisfaction along 
with the performance of the organisation (T.K, Das 1989). The 
"regularity of behaviour in organisation" is defined in control terms by 
Pennings and Woiceshyn (1987) while for E. Lawler (1976) control is the 
reason for the creation of three major human problems for organisation 
: rigid bureaucratic behaviour, inaccurate information and resistance.
Regardless of the approach or perspective, all systems of control, 
which may be as diverse as "the creation of a moral machinery, through 
the development of piece-work to the introduction of scientific 
management and human relations, although they all have implications 
for the structure of organisation, were oriented to individuals and groups 
within organisations ..." (S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley 1980, p.483) The 
authors of this quote were clearly influenced by the labour process 
approach. Labour process studies illuminate significantly the above 
point through the evolution of control. In this literature it has been 
conceptualized that several systems of control were initially developed as 
means of the capitalist labour process (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). 
Subsequently, during its historical development control has undergone 
various changes in relation to factors such as the size of the firms.
In the nineteenth century, the prevailing system of control was the 
"simple" one of "direct control" and was exercised over employees by the 
bosses of small business. This system was not based on a particular
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structure and thus, it was characterized by the arbitrary discretion of the 
employer. (R. Edwards 1979). Simple direct control was consequently 
developed into entrepreneurial control, which was also informal and 
unstructured. A later development was the development of hierarchical 
control marked by the growth of the firm. (R. Edwards 1979).
Even the hierarchical control which was based on the boss' 
(foreman, supervisor, manager) rights to hire and fire employees, to 
direct their work, to evaluate and promote or demote, to discipline them, 
to arrange rewards; in other words to act as the entrepreneurs have 
done "in the arbitrary, idiosyncratic and unencumbered way" did not 
solve the increased need for control a firm grew. (R. Edwards 1979).
With the development of scientific management the idea of 
technical control appeared. Scientific management promised a 
resolution to the control problem which gave rise to efficiency and greater 
control. "Taylorism'" in management seemed to apply "scientific 
methods" and was characterized by extreme rigidity. Control was 
exercised through three elements : the direction of the work task, the 
evaluation of the work done and the reward and punishment system. (P. 
Edwards 1979). Taylorism  was not limited to production workers, as 
all the previous systems had been, but in early 1917 it was also applied 
to the clerical workforce (Thompson 1983).
"Taylorism" appears "to dominate the world of production" and the 
work was organised under Taylor's principles (Braveman 1974). 
However, R. Edwards (1979) argues that Taylorism  was not a widely-
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tried system. "The extent and incidence of scientific management has 
always been something of a mystery " he states, (p. 101).
Moreover, regardless of the extent to which scientific control was 
implemented, it failed to resolve the crisis and capitalists sought for new 
forms of control.
By the end of the nineteenth century, firms had grown 
dramatically and the staff on the other hand had started to resist what 
appeared as increasingly arbitrary rules. Yet, the labour movement was 
maturing and a more structural form of control emerged.
Another kind of technical control "emerged from employers' 
experience in attempting to control the production operation of the firm." 
(P. Edwards 1979, p. 20). Technical control utilized punishment to 
obtain compliance and it, as Taylorism  had also done, gave rise to waves 
of employee resistance. Therefore,it was replaced by another structural 
form of control which, however, was more sophisticated and impersonal 
(R. Edwards 1979).
Bureaucratic control appears in the post-1945 period attempting 
to eliminate the prior forms of control. Its superiority was based on 
"systematic administrative structures." As Thompson (1983) states "it 
routinizes the functions and procedures of management, stratifies work 
and job titles and governs appointments and promotion by impersonal 
rules."
Unlike scientific control, bureaucratic control was developed in
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offices for controlling white-collar staff, but its success "impelled firms 
to apply the system more broadly." (R. Edwards p.21). As R. Edwards 
remarks, bureaucratic control constitutes the "managerial revolution" of 
the modem corporations, as it can apply to the office as well as to the 
production lines. The basis of this control is the impersonal force of 
rules or organisational policy. "In the most fundamental aspect" 
remarks R. Edwards "bureaucratic control institutionalized the exercise 
of hierarchical power within the firm. The definition and direction of 
work tasks, the evaluation of workers' performances and the distribution 
of rewards and imposition of punishments all came to depend upon 
established rules and procedures, elaborately and systematically laid 
out." (p. 131).
This impersonality involves an impersonal control technique which 
leads supervisors to detach themselves from their own feelings, 
attributing to the rules the responsibility for their own organisational 
behaviour. Rules also benefit managers in another way; they dictate 
unchangeable repetition of several organisational actions without 
repetition of instructions by the managers (A. Gouldner 1954). 
Furthermore, the rules alter the role and the power of supervision as the 
supervisors are also subject to supposedly objective rules and procedures. 
(Thompson 1983).
As R. Edwards suggests there are three basic elements through 
which control operates:
1. Defining work tasks and directing workers.
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2. Supervising and evaluating workers' performance.
3. Eliciting co-operation and enforcing compliance.
However, "what distinguishes bureaucratic control from other control 
systems is that it contains incentives aimed at evoking behaviour 
necessary to make bureaucratic control succeed." (p. 148). Therefore, 
whereas scientific and technical control emphasis punishment 
bureaucratic control puts emphasis on rewards, while it designs the 
picture of the "good worker".
In this sense bureaucratic control appears more totalitarian than 
other control systems as it does not merely require obedience and 
compliance to certain procedures but it requires the entire employees' 
behaviour to be consistent with its principle.
Nevertheless, bureaucratic control seems to generate less employee 
resistance, compared with other control systems. That is because, the 
control exercised is rather "opaque", insidious, and "affects human 
behaviour and attitudes in ways that do not involve the experience of 
being controlled or manipulated." (D, Buchanan and A. Huczynski 1985 
p. 474)
As P. Blau and R. Shoenherr (1971) argue, bureaucratic control is 
legitimized by the fact that it appears to be neutral.
Regardless of the degree of resistance that management control 
systems engender, in order to be successful, they must try to use 
mechanisms which influence human behaviour and overcome resistance.
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(MuUin 1985, 1989) One such mechanism is proposed by Tannenbaum 
as "participation", which can act as a means of control. According to 
him, participation on the one hand reduces dissatisfaction and increases 
the identification of members with the organisation, while on the other 
hand "paradoxically, through participation, management increases its 
control by giving up sources of its authority." (Tonnenbaum in D. Pugh, 
D. Hickson and G. Hinings 1983, 1984 p.78).
Muilin (1985, 1989) also lists some mechanisms for overcoming 
resistance :
-  consultation and participation
-  motivation
-  groups and the informal organisation
-  organisational structure
-  leadership style and system of management.
Hence control protects itself through the above-mentioned 
mechanisms which have in the effect of making it appear both more 
opaque and sophisticated. Control cannot be avoided as it is 
indispensable for organisations. (Tonnenbaum 1968, p.3).
The nature of control permits interpretation either positively or 
negatively. Its historical development introduces control as a means in 
the hands of capitalists, even where its precise genealogy pre-dates these 
uses (Clegg 1989), while it can also go beyond capitalistic societies and 
productive organisations. (S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley 1980).
Bureaucratic control appears to be the most sophisticated version
- 1 1 8 -
of the major historically evolved control system and it is the most 
applicable to modem organisations. It is especially suitable for public 
administrations. (Muilin 1985, 1989). The contemporary mechanisms 
through which it is exercised are closely related to means deployed for 
overcoming resistance. The next section build on the preceding to 
examine, first, the role of manager and, second, the response of 
employees in the context of bureaucratic control within the G.P.A.
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IV. 3 M anagement Control and the G.P.A.
3.a. Managers in the G.P.A.
As the literature about managerial control suggests (R. Edwards 
1979, Reed 1989 etc.) the structure of the organisation dictates the form 
of managerial control exercised. Therefore, in the G.P.A., managerial 
control operates through bureaucratic means which presuppose that 
control relies on rules and is exercised through a hierarchy, which, in 
terms of structure, corresponds more or less to the Weberian ideal type. 
Yet control, as various theories reveal, can be used to ensure employees' 
compliance (through various ways ranging from coercion to contest) in 
order to set goals for the organisation to achieve.
However, most of the theories seem to neglect the possibility that 
managerial control can be used as a means for Politics to enforce partial 
policies. The G.P.A. appears to be an example where managerial control 
serves Political interest to a great extent in a way which is routinely 
legitimized and taken for granted. That happens, first, by the 
replacement of the "career administrative officials" in senior managerial 
positions by "political" ones and, second, by promoting personnel in the 
various managerial posts without meritocratic procedures.
The first question, seems to be the signal which indicates the 
presence of politics in the administrative process and pre-defines the 
quality of the managerial control exercised. According to Weberian
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theory, elected politicians must be placed in the senior positions in the 
hierarchy in order for bureaucracy to operate successfully, and also for 
bureaucrats' power to be kept in balance. In the G.P.A. the top of the 
hierarchy in each administrative unit (Ministry) is the Minister. Under, 
this person, according to the theory, administrative staff should build up 
the administrative pyramid. Moreover, in the G.P.A. there are two other 
positions at the top of the hierarchy (under the Minister) which are 
filled by "political officials", who, however, are burdened with clear-cut 
administrative accountability. These are the positions of the Secretary 
Generals and Secretary "Specialists" which replaced previously 
established administrative positions such as the General Director.
Under the legislation N. 1232/1982 and N. 1588/1985, the above 
mentioned "political officials" were appointed for a certain period, (i.e. the 
period that the political party which appointed them was in power) 
according to the Minister and without particular criteria other than their 
Political allegiance to the (government of the day. (Makridimitris 1990).
Besides manifesting the party politicization of the G.P.A. this 
routine practice creates various operational problems. However, the 
"political officials" do not usually come from the administrative area and 
are often not aware of the administrative process. In addition they often 
do not have the necessary managerial qualification of training. 
(Athanasopoulos 1983). Therefore in their control function they are 
instructed from "above", or follow strictly the "law". Furthermore, their 
lack of administrative experience creates problematic situations v is- a-vis
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san experienced "subordinate" who questions every order given. (Flogaitis 
1987). Finally, the fact that "political officials" are usually younger than 
the managers in the various managerial posts, or the senior public 
servants, overthrows the scale of age in the organisation and along with 
other factors such as the violation of the pay-scale, generates anti- 
productive attitudes. (Flogaitis 1987). There are also a number of other 
problems, such as those related to continuous changes of the "Political 
officials" and resistance from employees.
The second question concerning the promotion of employees to the 
various managerial posts has already been analyzed in the preceding 
chapter, as it is also a question of ''rousphetV' and political interference.
From the foregoing analysis it may be recalled that the managers 
in the G.P.A. who are called to exercise control are burdened with 
"political obligations" and therefore "sensitive" to the way they are going 
to exercise control.
Agamemnon, an ex-Secretary "Specialist" illustrates in an implicit 
way the point made above :
"I could say that in this country, at this very moment, 
there are no suitable officials to deal with control."
What he implies is the lack of qualified managers who rely on 
"what" they know and not on "who" they know.
The lack of managerial training is also highlighted by another 
manager, Achilles:
"There are not qualified managers in the G.P.A. nowadays."
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He implies that although managers are university qualified, they have 
not done "management studies" specifically. Hence managers are 
criticised in the G.P.A. for lacking qualifications, for being incompetent 
and for their political manipulation.
On the basis of these findings, it might be concluded that there 
really is no hope for any change in the G.P.A. This is particularly so 
when even within the trade union there are altitudes such as : "the 
managers in the G.P.A. must be characterized by political allegiance to 
the party in power, inasmuch as it is the only way for the political 
decision of the government of the day to be implemented." (This was 
revealed by Priamus a trade unionist as a statement which had been 
expressed in a congress of AAEAY, the public servants' trade union.
Nevertheless, control, as interwoven in the management function, 
is exercised, poorly or not, successfully or not, regardless of managers' 
specific qualifications or "political" derivation.
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3.b. The means of managerial control in the G.P.A. and its implications 
for employee identity.
According to several theories about managerial control mentioned 
in the previous section, control is exercised through different strategies 
such as organisation structure, recruitment and training, rewards and 
punishment, policies and rules, budget machinery (Don Hellrieged and 
I Slocum, 1978) or through expert power, selective recruitment and 
allocation of resources (Blau and Shoenherr 1971). Specifically, 
however, bureaucratic control, as it has been referred to, is exercised by 
defining work tasks and directing workers, supervising and evaluating 
workers' performance, eliciting cooperation and enforcing compliance.
In the G.P.A. laws and rules, either general or specific, for certain 
workplaces outline the tasks of employees without, however, going into 
details. The Minister has the responsibility for delegating power down 
through the hierarchy (Makridimitris 1990) and to define the tasks of 
pubhc servants. Therefore managers' accountability depends on the job 
security of Ministers. Hence, this generates a climate of uncertainty, 
given that every four years (the longest period between elections) 
accountabilities are modified. Furthermore, during the pre-election 
period managers are substantially without any responsibility as the 
Ministers who had assigned competencies to them resign before elections.
Consequently there are periods when managerial control does not exist 
when the G.P.A. appears to be a system in paralysis.
- 1 2 4 -
This is consistent with my observations when this research was 
developed. Managers in the departments seemed to be more preoccupied 
with political campaigns than with managerial control while the staff, 
regardless of ranking position, joined political events taking place in their 
workplace, such as talks by politicians, during working hours. The 
entire upheaval, however, can be justified as necessary if it is taken into 
account that managerial position and the "prevailing spirit" at the 
organisation depends greatly on the election results and the new 
Minister.
This is also explained by E. Etzioni -  Halevy (1979) who referring 
to the Australian case points out: "material benefit accrues only if the 
candidate or the party comes to power (or it is maintained in power) 
which makes his or its election a matter of self-interest to the 
beneficiaries." (p. 75-75).
Therefore, even if not all employees are considered as beneficiaries, 
they all seem to be amenable to the consequences of the hnk between 
administration and Politics. "The existing irrationality turns out to be 
functional, because it is easily amenable to dealing with clientele. The 
bureaucratic machine itself becomes a party to such dealings, since the 
general inefficiency allows the senior ranks to transform into negotiable 
items what should be institutional duties." (Ferraresi cited in Clegg, 
Dow and Borehan, 1983).
The above points are illustrated by Patroclus’ statement who is a 
supervisor and has been working for 25 years in the G.P.A.:
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"The managers in the central services but also in the 
regional ones are dependent on their political master, the 
Minister. Their responsibilities are not derived from the 
position he or she holds but they are delegated by the 
Minister. Therefore the dependence on the political 
master is direct and...you see, when it is pre-election 
period the G.P.A. gives up working, it is entirely paralyzed 
until the time the new Minister will come to set the rules 
for new start."
From Patroclus' statement one can infer that managerial control is 
unlikely to be consistent and stable and appears to be quite changeable 
and geared to current conditions. Directing workers, which is the other 
strategy of bureaucratic control, seems to be rather neglected in the 
G.P.A. According to R. Edwards (1979), directing workers implies 
carefully articulated job descriptions but also training for the new 
employees, which as E. Langer (1970, in R. Edwards 1979) remarks "it 
is used for articulation and rehearsal of the unwritten procedures and for 
teaching the implicit expectations of the job. (p. 137).
. As we discussed above, explicitly defined job descriptions do not 
exist in the G.P.A. As far as training sources are concerned, at the 
outset of employees' career, they are non-existent. For individuals to 
learn what is expected of them doing their job in the G.P.A. they must 
rely on the willingness of their colleagues, to train and educate them, 
rather than on the support of managers.
All the respondents made comments about this point. The 
majority of public servants in the G.P.A. saw themselves as "fish in 
troubled waters" at the beginning of their career, asking for help 
anywhere. Telemachus, a high-ranking public servant who has been
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working for fifteen years in the G.P.A,, remembers:
"when I first joined the G.P.A., I found myself in an office 
with a supervisor who wanted to teach me nothing. She 
expected me to be entirely dependent on her and to do only 
subordinated and mundane jobs. She didn't instruct me to 
draw up a document, although I asked her and I was 
suffering..."
Hecuba, however, a clerical public servant has a different 
experience:
"I was taught my job by an ambitious supervisor we had.
She used to give us initiatives and burden us with 
responsibilities, while she held us a lot to achieve what we 
were doing. But she loaded us with stress, as she wanted 
everything to get done straight away, without any delay."
Many employees attribute learning about their jobs to their colleagues. 
An equally common view of many respondents was that a training 
course at the beginning of their careers would have facilitated their self- 
confidence and it would have made them less dependent on colleagues or 
supervisors. In addition, learning the job from colleagues tends to 
reproduce the status quo in the G.P.A., since along with the instructions 
for the job the "establishment" mentality of the older pubhc servants is 
transmitted to the new appointees. That is to say, new recruits are 
sociahzed into the informed workplace culture.
The supervision and evaluation of workers' performance was 
discussed in the previous chapter. As the appraisal system in the G.P.A. 
is not in practice part of the control strategy, it hardly contributes to 
promotion and to career development for the reasons which have been 
analyzed. Furthermore, the appraisal system hardly contributes to
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"eliciting cooperation and enforcing compliance" since it fails to reward
or punish employees. Rewards and punishment are rather meaningless
terms in the G.P.A. There are no "exceptional" promotions due to
excellent work performance. Furthermore, the legislation does not
provide for any kind of financial reward to those graded "excellent."
Although punishment is included in the legislation, it is rarely applied.
The history of the G.P.A. since tenure has been established, has not
been characterized by many dismissals as a means of punishment.
Employees, also, have no such experience themselves or with colleagues.
Menelaus, the manager, highlights this point:
"during my public life (he has been working for sixteen 
years in the G.P.A.) I haven't heard that a pubhc servant 
has been dismissed, apart from a few exceptional cases 
where corruption had been involved."
Menelaus' view is supported by almost all respondents in this project.
Besides rewards and punishment, managerial control in the G.P.A.
seems to neglect other elements such as incentives, which, also, lead to
"enforcing compliance and ehciting cooperation." Nevertheless, talking
about incentives, the question arises: what do employees really want in
the G.P.A. in order to cooperate effectively?
The answer comes from employees' responses, which are summed
up as follows:
1. Public servants want meritocracy in the procedures which affect 
their career, from selection to recognition, and therefore ask for the 
depoliticization of the G.P.A.
2. They want recognition as employees and as personalities.
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3. They want participation in decision making.
4. They want career-life training.
5. They are also naturally interested in better pay and improvement 
in their work conditions.
What this classification implies is that managerial control 
has to deal with and satisfy public servants' "abstract needs" which 
seem to be related to employees' identity within the workplace. 
The crisis of effectiveness and efficiency in the G.P.A. appears to 
be accompanied by public servants' crisis of identity. That is to 
say, that managerial control reinforces problems of identity for 
employees.
"what am I now? wonders Pares, a university qualified 
high-ranking public servant, and he continues:
"Nothing. My personality is ignored along with my 
experience and my knowledge."
He had asked this question after he had enumerated a number of 
procedures which reveal that his personality is actually ignored; he does 
not participate in decision-making, he is not allowed to take initiatives, 
he is not appraised fairly on a meritocratic basis. Pares' question- 
statement manifests clearly the crisis while indicating some weak points 
of managerial control.
Participation in decision-making and undertaking of initiatives are 
some of the areas which reflect and reinforce employees' creativity and 
growth in maturity (Morgan 1984). This is especially so for Greeks who 
are pushed by historical and cultural traditions (democratic tradition) of
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participation in decision-making and it appears to be essential for their
public life. The majority of the respondents in this project refer to
participation in decision-making as a factor of great importance. They
seek to share in managerial control. Also, they ask for initiatives while
being willing to take any responsibility that initiative entails.
A few quotations will illustrate these points:
"I wish I had more ability to take initiatives and 
participate in the decision-making. I could have solved a 
lot of my problems." remarks Penelope, the supervisor of 
the department of administrative affairs.
"I wanted to be able to take more initiatives. That could 
make my job easier and I could perform twice as fast as I 
do now." says Ajax, an employee of the computing 
department.
"For me, participation in decision-making means 
recognition of my value as an employee, which, also, means 
that I am trusted and that I am capable of taking 
responsibility." states Iphigenia, a clerical public servant.
Meritocracy in every bureaucratic procedure is the other issue ^
that employees highlight. |
"Meritocracy in every aspect of our public life is an |
incentive for me and pushes me to perform more j
efficiently." I
.remarks Jbkasta, a university qualified public servant in the |IInternational Relations department. Her view is supported by Patroclus |
a supervisor. j
"If I know that my performance at work as an official, and 
not my political allegiance would be appraised, and that 
would be the only criterion, I would work more 
productively."
These comments illuminate the problem highlighted in previous
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chapters, of the absence of meritocracy in bureaucratic procedures. Both 
employees wish to define themselves as "employees with values and
merits" and to reject the evaluation of themselves as "employees who 
have the position because of favour."
This need of employees to be identified as valuable and to hold a 
position on merit, is interrelated with their need for recognition. 
Employees were very concerned to have their identities confirmed in the 
workplace.
They want their organisational behaviour and performance to be
acknowledged and seek to be recognised as "good employees" not only
from their superiors but also from their peers. Artemis, a clerical public
servant articulates the point:
"Recognition from my supervisor but also from my peers 
gives me satisfaction and it is an encouragement to perform 
better."
Besides Artemis, the majority of the respondents defined recognition as
the number one incentive.
Public servants also want training m order to gain knowledge and
improve their performance, while strengthening in this way their official
status. Hecuba, a clerical public servant, highlights this point:
"training drives you to another way of thinking and helps 
you to feel more confident as an employee and more 
comfortable with your job."
What Hecuba implies is that employees feel more confident and powerful
when they know how to perform better. They want to adjust their
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public life to the modem world and they want to know how to use 
technological advances. Training helps them to keep pace with the 
development of technology. It seems to be challenging for employees 
that there be the implementation of new organisational methods or the 
use of technological advances. Training keeps their minds open to 
changes and to new ideas. It also appears to be another means for 
identity inasmuch as it satisfies this need through expertise and 
knowledge which are additional sources of power, according to 
bureaucratic theory.
Money, for public servants in the G.P.A. is also implicated in the 
struggle for identity. Money itself is not an important monitor, as the 
majority of the respondents argued, but it is important as a means to 
establish employees' identity and status. For example, Achilles, a 
manager, remembers his supervisor's advice when he first went to work: 
"You must always have money with you when you go to the cafe and 
don't allow people to know that you can't afford to buy a drink for them 
because of your poor salary as a public servant."
The paradox which, however, arises in the G.P.A. is that while the 
employees appear to consider money as a second tier of value, outsiders 
hold the view that public servants are only interested in how to increase 
their salaries. This is reflected in the way the press and public opinion 
criticize the strikes of public servants. I would argue that Political 
mastery usually highlights money and isolates it from the other goals 
that employees struggle for. What is achieved by that is that,on the one
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hand, wage demands are easier to be attained than other employee 
demands such as job satisfaction. (It must be taken into account that 
public servants' wage demands are usually reasonable and within the 
limits of the budget of the state.) Furthermore, Political mastery 
secures the support of public opinion in the case of excessive "wage 
-demands by public servants, especially when for the majority of the 
citizens public servants are considered as the "drones" of the state. On 
the other hand. Political mastery overcomes the difficulty of coping with 
the "abstract" issues, which seems to be really important for the 
employees' public life which, however, might entail some political cost. 
In this sense the weight is shifted from important but "abstract" issues, 
to practical and tangible ones. Therefore money besides being a means 
of employee identity, is a means of control.
Working conditions are also used as a means of identity. 
Employees desire comfortable offices, well-fumished with heating or air 
condition. They try even at their own expense to make their offices 
"more civilized" not only for their own sake but for their clients, as the 
condition of the office appears to be a source of prestige for employees.
Alcestis, a clerical pubhc servant illustrates the above point:
"I tried to humanize this place bringing plants from my 
house, collecting chairs here and there from several 
offices...I'm ashamed when clients come to my office, 
because of the poor appearance of it..."
Unfortunately, in their control practices managers ignore how important
it is to achieve coordination and active cooperation by satisfying employee
needs. They appear to be stuck to the "traditional" spirit which requires
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subordination to the Politics of the workplace, hidden, however, behind 
the impersonality of the laws. The previous chapter has already 
analyzed how appraisal and meritocracy are treated by managers while 
this section revealed how critically they affect employee identity in the 1
workplace. This crisis of employee identity along with a high degree of 
dissatisfaction are the results of the way managerial control is exercised.
Hence, employees respond to this situation with a wave of resistance.
3c. Public servants' resistance.
The expressions of resistance in the G.P.A. appear to be apathy, 
absenteeism, psychological withdrawal from the job and turnover. All 
these symptoms are expected as various theories observe (E. Locke in 
Gruneberg and Wall 1984), when employees are dissatisfied with their 
job.
Absenteeism appears to be the first action of employee resistance
although it is only a temporary solution. In an article in Public Sector
(March 1988). Dr. Th. Katsanevas, a member of the executive office of
IIA20K, remarks that "public servants" absenteeism has been calculated
at a percentage of 30% -  40% for various reasons." However, Achilles,
a Manager, highlights the point:
"I must confess that there appear to be quite a number of 
unjustified absences which tends to become a permanent 
phenomenon. It can be attributed to political interference 
in the G.P.A. in that some managers, for political purposes, 
are very flexible in cases of absenteeism. Furthermore, 
absenteeism is a temporary escape from a workplace which 
does not meet employee needs."
Ajax, an employee in the Computing department reinforces the view that
dissatisfaction leads to absenteeism.
"The conditions in my office push me away from it. 
Sometimes I skive off and I don't care if somebody 
discovers it."
I have also practiced absenteeism as a way of avoiding a workplace 
which made me unhappy. In some cases I used my children's pseudo­
illness as a justification to take a day-off; but sometimes even a few 
hours away from the office was a great relief. Indeed it was this feeling
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which pushed me to be involved in this project, trying for satisfaction 
away from a workplace which suffocated me.
Apathy is the prevailing form of resistance on a permanent basis 
which has been identified as a "normal" situation in the G.P.A. During 
their working hours employees appear to have greater concern for their 
private life than their public one. All the afternoon activities of 
employees are usually arranged during work-time through telephone 
calls and letters. A prevailing view is that little damage will be done by 
postponing pieces of work. There are hundreds of examples of this 
practice in public life. To this extent, it is no exaggeration to say that 
"working hours seem to be equal to the time of bodily pressure in the 
office." "Tsoukalas 1987, (However, there are no responses to highlight 
this fact, as employees defend their official status").
The majority of the respondents pretended that they were content 
with their job. Nevertheless, they would not like to talk about it in then- 
private lives. In a sense they seemed to try to convince themselves that 
their work had some meaning. To acknowledge that this was not so 
would be too frightening because it would require fundamental changes 
in their lives. Hence, these workers preferred the security of familiarity 
and routine to the unknown alternative.
There are, however, a few employees who admitted their 
psychological withdrawal from their jobs and their prioritization of 
domestic "private life", such as Athena, a clerical public servant who has 
been working only for a year.
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"I used to be very concerned about my job when I first 
came, but I'm not any more..."
Psychological withdrawal is also illuminated by I. Pega, Administrative
manager in the National Printing house, in an article in Public Sector
(July-August 1989):
"Most of the employees seek activities outside their 
workplace."
This statement again implies that employees psychologically withdraw 
from their jobs. Yet, whatever the situation for employees, they do not 
often resign from the G.P.A. Therefore turnover is not very high, given 
that the labour market in Greece is rather tight. A higher rate of 
turnover, however, is noticed among particularly well-qualified 
employees.
In an article in Public Sector Dr. N. Vitazakis reports that from 
fifty particularly well-qualified employees (Me, PhD) in one year's time 
twenty two quit the public sector. Yet, Achilles, a manager, refers to a 
case which he know about personally, of a highly qualified public servant 
who "quit the G.P.A. in disappointment because he realized that nothing 
was going to change." Another paradox appears in the G.P.A. in the
case of the managers. They themselves resist, too. They are not
excluded from absenteeism. However much authority they have, they 
tend to practice lateness.
Managers' working hours tend to be determined at the managers' 
discretion, although working-time is defined by law for all employees 
regardless of hierarchical position. Agamemnon, an ex-top manager,
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illuminates the point.
"If you are a manager, you can't say that I'm coming at 9
0 clock and I'm going in at 1 oclock."
Agamemnon's statement reveals the prevailing managers' strategy of 
trying to reduce the working hours with various justifications. 
(Formally the working day consists of TVs hours). For them the practice 
of absenteeism or lateness causes few problems once control seems to be 
less rigid for controllers even in bureaucracies where everybody is subject 
to the rules.
This also contributes to apathy-resistance leaving for tomorrow 
what could be done today, pretending that they have excessive 
responsibility and intellectual work. Many times in my pubhc hfe I was 
told by supervisors to go back next day to discuss my work-related 
problems, because they were preoccupied with more serious problems. 
This justification, allows them to postpone the solution to another 
problem while giving them time to involve themselves in endless talk 
with peers, superiors or clients about matters barely concerning the 
operation of the organisation. These endless talks can be interpreted as 
a kind of legitimised resistance which reveals managers' unsatisfied 
needs for meaningful work. (Reed 1989).
Concluding, one can say that managerial control in the G.P.A. 
reveals some peculiarities. The majority of the responsible officials 
exercising control are selected on the basis of political convictions while 
the top-managers are clear-cut political officials. Bureaucratic control 
seems to take a particularly invidious form in the G.P.A., as employees
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not only feel that they are controlled; they feel also that they are badly 
controlled. This can generate a crisis of identity and strong job 
dissatisfaction. Effectively, they want more, better, tighter control
As a consequence they respond with apathy, lateness, work 
avoidance, strategies and sometimes resignation. In these resistance 
strategies even managers take part. The employees need to express 
their resistance strongly and collectively. It is such sentiment and 
action which leads to the development of a trade union.
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rV.4. Public servant’s trade union.
The first movement for public sector trade unionism appears in the 
20th century. According to Tsoukala (1986), until that time public 
servants seemed to be preoccupied with internal conflicts of their class 
while neglecting the issue of the state-employer. They appeared unable 
to distinguish their common interests and to resist any violation of their 
rights. Although the 19th century was characterized as "anomalous" for 
the G.P.A., public servants did not generate any particular resistance.
Even the matter of tenure which is considered as a breakthrough 
in pubhc sector history was not the result of struggle but a "rule" 
enforced firom the "top". Tsoukalas attributes this phenomenon to 
political, economic and social conditions under which the G.P.A. was 
established and which led to the creation of the view of a state bonus- 
giver rather than a state employer.
However, employees altered their views through the years and 
nowadays the public servants' trade union (AAEAY) has 199,875 members 
which represent fifty three (53) particular occupational trade unions of 
the G.P.A. (K. Papaspiropoulou -  Mandi 1990). Public servants 
membership in AAEAY is 64%, given that the number of pubhc servants 
(under tenure or contract) is 314,000 (K. Papaspiropoulou -  Manoli 
1990).
The following table, which is included in the K. Papaspiropoulou -  
Manoli study about the 27th congress of AAEAY, shows the increase of
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membership during the last decade and is based on evidence of the three 
last congresses of AAEAY (25, 26, 27).
Congress Occupational Trade Unions Number of AAEAY members
25"» 25 95.625
26 (h 46 162.750
27 ih 53 199.875
The increase of AAEAY membership implies that pubhc servants
have started to become conscious about their role within society, as
another class of employees and ceasing to identify so closely with the
State. (Tsoukalas 1986). This point is highlighted by Laertes a trade
unionist in the central committee of : AAEAY
"Over the last few years, pubhc servants gave up 
considering themselves as a particular class in the society.
They became conscious that they belonged to a similar 
working class hke that of factory-workers or the owners of 
small businesses. AAEAY therefore has been involved in 
common demonstrations with other workers' trade-unions."
Nevertheless,pubhc sector trade unionism maintains some 
peculiarities, which derive from the general legal framework within 
which pubhc servants work. (Nickols and Beynon in Thompson 1983). 
As an example, these pubhc sector unions have no bargaining power, 
because pay and economic matters in the G.P.A. are defined by laws 
which concern its general operation. In this sense the role of AAEAY 
is limited to introductory and advisory action, giving proposals for the 
configuration of bills concerning pubhc sector workers' affairs. However,
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the decision-making belongs to the parliament.
In order to affect the decision making AAEAY organises pressure
actions, but that is the only power which it can exercise.
Moreover, employee participation in resistance actions is not
particularly high. This is remarked on by Priamus the trade unionist
who is in the central committee of AAEAY.
"How can we press the government when the members' 
participation in a strike hardly reaches 35%?"
Poor employee participation in organised actions by AAEAY
substantially weakens AAEAY's power. On the other hand, the
justification of this phenomenon, as employees state, is that, regardless
of their participation, AAEAY is unable to get any results. Therefore a
vicious circle of apathy and weakness emerges here. Polyxena, a clerical
pubhc servant, articulates this view which is shared by the majority of
pubhc servants:
"I don't think that AAEAY has reported any important 
achievements especially in the last few years. The reason
must be sought in the political sphere may be there were
controversies between the leadership and trade unionists 
with political affihations to the party in power."
Polyxena's statement interprets, also, employee belief that AAEAY fails
to achieve the ends it sets. Even the ends set are treated suspiciously
by pubhc servants, along with the process of achieving those ends.
Telemachus, a university quahfied pubhc servant states:
"Trade unionism has ended up as a movement for certain 
goals. (He implies goals instructed by the political party 
in power) I haven't found a unionism which doesn't serve 
the goals of the political parties in power."
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In addition, some other employees not only share Telemachus' view but, 
also, do not appreciate the end set by AAEAY. They believe that "alT 
the goals AAEAY sets are just "one": money.
Iphigenia, a clerical public servant, articulates this point: 
"AAEAY deals only with matters of money."
This statement supports the view that Politics highlights money as the 
only need of employees. Thus, not only is pubhc opinion negative 
towards employee goals, but the employees themselves are disoriented. 
Furthermore, the statement seems to be inconsistent with employee 
needs, which were discussed in the previous section and which show that 
money, although important, is only a "second tier" target.
The pubhc servants' trade union is also characterized by the
problems generated by political interference. Political involvement was
particularly strong until 1984 according to the trade unionists, Priamus
and Laertes. As Priamus states:
"AAEAY had substantially been abolished. After a 
congress, which was a fiasco and, also elections which were 
manipulated, the majority of the leadership consisted of 
trade unionists who were affihated to the political party in 
power."
Nevertheless, both trade unionists believe that the phenomenon 
belongs to the past. In conclusion, despite the dysfunctions of trade 
unionism in the G.P.A. it still operates as a countervailing power 
(Morgan 1984) which sets hmits to the exercise of managerial control. 
In addition, unions can create a feeling of hope in public servants that 
the situation in the G.P.A. will improve, while they, also, feel less
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vulnerable to managerial dictates. (G. Peter 1978).
The recent increase in the membership tends to support those 
arguments. Furthermore, the goals AAEAY set in the last congress, such 
as implementation of meritocratic criteria for employees’ recruitment and 
promotion (K. Papaspiropoulou -  Manoli 1990) prove that AAEAY intends 
not only to operate as a countervailing power but seeks to be a 
generative, productive source of power within the workplace in order to 
generate important social changes.
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IV.5. C onclusion
This chapter has explored the various theories of organisation 
which introduce control as the main function of management or as the 
management itself. According to labour process theories, managerial 
control was generated to facilitate the capitalists’ interests. However, the 
form of control which seems to serve this aim, while creating less 
resistance is bureaucratic control. It operates in an insidious way, 
through impersonal rules and orders, giving employees the feeling of not 
being controlled, thereby minimizing their resistance.
Bureaucratic control appears to be the most suitable form of 
control in large organisations and pubhc bureaucracies. However, in the 
G.P.A. it is Politics which shapes the nature of control and resistance. 
Political involvement impinges on the implementation of bureaucratic 
control and leads it to malfunction while generating employee resistance.
Resistance is expressed through apathy, disenchantment, absenteeism, 
psychological withdrawal and a degree of turnover. Control is also 
tightly related to employee identity crises in the G.P.A., while preventing 
them from practising changes.
Collective and active employee resistance is manifested through 
pubhc sector trade unions. Unionism in the G.P.A. operates in an 
advisory capacity to the government as far as pubhc servants' affairs are 
concerned but also reacts strongly (strikes, stoppages of work) to protect 
employee rights to achieve certain goals. Having explored ''rouspheti"
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in the context of selection process (chapter 3) and managerial control and 
labour resistance, chapter 4, the final empirical chapter, will now 
consider workplace culture in the G.P.A.
- 1 4 6 -
Chapter V ; Workplace culture 
V .l. Introduction
This chapter seeks to complete the question under consideration, 
that Politics has a decisive influence in bureaucracy, by analyzing 
elements which form the organizational structure of the G.P.A.
As has already been discussed, managerial control contributes to 
the formation of a certain organisational culture, which, in the case of 
the G.P.A. is a culture of apathy and resistance. However, there are 
additional factors such as societal traits and practices which greatly 
contribute to the configuration of the organisational culture, therefore 
both the formation of cliques within the workplace and the generation of 
relationships based on Political convictions will be highlighted as having 
a decisive role in the operation of the G.P.A.
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V.2. C u ltu re o f th e  G .P JV.
2.a. B rief Review of Organisational Culture
Before we examine the organisational culture of the G.P.A. it is 
necessary to refer briefly to the concept of culture Eis it has been viewed 
by organisational theorists and sociologists.
The concept of culture is "one of the two or three most complicated 
words in the English language "states William (1976, cited in Clegg and 
Redding 1990, p.31]). Culture is a complicated term not only in the 
English language, I would argue, but also in every other language as it 
is connected with a great deal of social, political and educational 
phenomena. Different social sciences operate with different definitions 
and meanings of culture. For the process of this study culture will be 
considered in relation to organisation.
Weber views culture as a value-concept (Clegg and Dunkerley 
1980). As he states "Empirical reality becomes "culture" to us because 
and in so far as we relate it to value ideas. It includes those segments 
and only those segments of reality which have become significant to us 
because of the value relevance", (p. 38).
Mats Alveson (1987), in his study of "Organisational culture and 
idealogy" presents five definitions given by some theorists who treat the 
organisation as their key point of reference.
For Louis "culture... refers to a shared system of values, norms and
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symbols. The term culture conveys an entire image, an integrated set of 
dimensions/characteristics, and the whole beyond the part. Bate (in 
Alvesson, 1978) considers culture as "the ideas, meanings and values 
people hold in common and to which they subscribe collectively " while for 
Pettigrew (in Alvesson 1987) "culture is the system of ... publicly and 
accepted contemplated meanings operating for a given group at a given 
time", (p. 5).
Trice and Beyer (in Alvesson 1987) put emphasis on the 
components of culture which are:
1. "its substance or the network of meanings contained in its ideologies, 
norms and values; 2. its forms, or the practices whereby these meanings 
are expressed affirmed and communicated to members". Finally Morgan 
(1984) introduces culture as "shared meanings, shared understandings 
and shared sense making... In talking about culture we are talking 
about a process of reality construction that allows people to see and 
understand particular events, actions, objects, utterances, or situations 
in distinctive ways", (p. 128). Edgar Schein (1985), also defines culture 
as "the basic assumptions and beliefs shared by members of the 
organisation that operate unconsciously and what define in a basic taken 
for granted fashion an organisation's view of itself and its environment", 
(p. 7).
For Morgan (1986) culture illuminates in particular the human 
side of organisation. Observation of day-to-day functioning of the 
organisational groups (s) to which one belongs, as if one was an outsider,
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shows the culture or the subculture of the area.
As one becomes aware of the ways that individuals interact, the 
language they use, the images and themes of their discussion and their 
daily ritualism one discovers and defines the culture of those specific 
areas (Morgan 1986). Culture develops gradually and it is the result of 
the groups experience. It is a kind of necessity for groups to adopt a 
common language among themselves (F. Heffom 1989); a way of setting 
boundaries and selecting members; setting norms for handling 
interpersonal relationships; criteria for rewarding or punishing their 
members. Therefore, cultures have taboos and forbidden or enforced 
forms of behaviour -  i.e. they are characterized by informal rules.
As one tries to find explanations for the aspects of the 
organisational culture, one is usually led to the history of the workplace 
or the society in which the organisation develops. (Morgan 1986). 
History has stressed many variations in national characteristics and 
views of the meaning of life along with differences in national 
philosophies and patterns of organisation and administration. Dyson 
(1989) argues that "countries have evolved their own distinctive 
industrial cultures which reflect traditions of public authority but are 
also moulded by the historical conditions of industrialization. Such 
industrial cultures are expressed in attitudes and behaviour but are also 
embodied in institutions and form a mediating factor in the policy 
process", (in Clegg and Redding, p. 131]). In his view, applied to East 
Asia, for instance, "the success of organisation in Japan, Korea, Tawian,
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Hong Kong, and Singapore was due in large part to certain key traits 
shared by the majority of organisation members which were attributable 
to an upbringing in the Confucian tradition". (H. Kahn [1979], cited in 
Clegg and Redding [1990. p. 38]. Some commentators, such as Morgan, 
have noted how what may be conceived as macro-cultural phenomena, 
can have important organizational consequences. Japanese workers, he 
notes differ from British. While the former appear dedicated to the 
system, even if she/he finds many aspects of the system distasteful, the 
latter often defines him/herself as in opposition to a system which they 
perceive to have exploited their ancestors and them as well.
In France, as Crozier outlines, bureaucratic organisations have 
their peculiarities attributable to the French social culture. Likewise, 
Greek organisations appear differentiated from those of other European 
countries, because of their cultural characteristics. (Tsoukalas 1986, 
Mouzelis 1978, Athanasopoulos 1983). Thus, as Morgan has proposed 
"the point is that culture whether Japanese, Arab, British, Canadian, 
Chinese, French or American, shapes the character of the organisation". 
(Morgan 1986, p. 117).
According to M. Alvesson, (1987) values, ideologies and cultural 
competencies which appear in organisational life are primarily rooted in 
the social culture. He also believes that general ideologies of ethics of 
work are of decisive importance for people’s motives and aspirations, 
along with the differences between the sexes and among the various 
minority groups.
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Alvesson’s view is supported by F. Heffron (1989) who argues that 
Americans in their homes, in their schools, by their peers and by the 
mass media have been exposed to and pressurized to accept the domingint 
values of American society. Many of these values reflect and reinforce 
those found within the organisation. Likewise, in trying to find the 
features and elements in the culture that influence behaviour in the 
G.P.A. one will go to social culture to seek for an explanation.
2.b. Factors influencing the G.P.A.
The conventional upbringing of children in Greece is based on 
allegiance to "the State", "the religion" and "the family". These three 
values constitute the foundations of Greek society, as history emphasizes.
As a matter of fact, Greeks seem to neglect the notion of the state 
in their everyday fife and yet they appear to be extremely nationalistic 
when the state is threatened (Vacalopoulos, 1983). As some writers 
remark, Greeks confront their State in an inimical or suspicious way (G. 
Langrod, 1964, Woodhouse, 1990). "The state is the hereditary enemy, 
identified with anonymous bureaucracy", remarks Woodhouse (1990) in 
his article about the Greek psyche, while G. Langrod (1964) in a study 
about the G.P.A. states: "... Greek nation has an implicit idea about the 
state... the Turkish occupation has left traces of suspicion towards any 
kind of authority".
Furthermore the role of Politics throughout the years allows a
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great number of interpretations about the aims of the state and the role 
of politicians, "The function of a Member of Parliament is to defend his 
constituent's personal interests, to secure jobs for them and to exercise 
influence. National policy-making is well down the list of his priorities", 
reveals Woodhouse (1990) again, explaining this way, why Greeks are 
suspicious towards their state.
The role of Politics seems to reinforce Greek’s inherent 
individualism (Vacalopoulos 1983). The president of Greece K. 
Karamanlis, according to Woodhouse (1990), who has written a biography 
of Karamanlis, pointed out that Greeks are individualists "whose 
loyalties in normal times are strong only in proportion to their 
narrowness: to their families, their relations, their neighbours, their 
province, but rarely (except in times of war or national crisis) to the 
state". (Woodhouse, 1990. p. 6). This individualism leads Greeks to use 
every means in order to achieve their personal goals (Vacalopoulos 1983). 
Therefore, cliques in the workplace many times appear to be used in 
order to facilitate individual interests. Furthermore, political patronage 
and clientelism also serve individuality when material inducements are 
provided m a micro-level which entails benefits to families or to 
individuals. "This device turns into an explicit exchange of benefits for 
votes". (Etzioni-Halevy 1979, p. 10).
However, Greeks, also, have the tendency to involve themselves in 
Political affairs and debates. It is the philosophy of Aristotle which 
enhances this tendency: the citizens must contribute to the common
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interest..." (Politics). This strong politicization of Greeks has been 
commented on very often, as characteristic of the Greek nation. Winston 
Churchill points out in his memoirs: "The Greeks rival the Jews in being 
the most political-minded race in the world". (W. Churchill, "the second 
world war", vol. 5, p. 413), The tendency to politicization in correlation 
to the tendency to individualism contributes greatly to the configuration 
of the peculiar organisational culture, where Politics underlie the aspects 
of organisational life. Thus, it is not surprising that the primary concern 
of personnel in Greek organisations when a newly-appointed employee 
appears is his/her political identity. From experience I know and 
comments from research respondents confirm that nobody wonders about . 
the qualification or the personality of the "new person". The basic . 
question is always: "What is the political party he/she supports?" The 
future social and organisational hfe of the "new person" is absolutely 
dependent on the reply to this question. Friendships, participation in 
cliques, isolation or not, everything is determined by the answer to this 
critical question. This phenomenon will be considered further in the next 
section.
The family, is a critical value for Greek society. As has been 
mentioned above, the Greeks consider the family to be a basic concern. 
Indeed, patronage and political clientelism rely on the allegiance of 
Greeks to their family. Also, the conventional image of the working 
woman and the prevailing idea that woman’s natural position is in the 
house, is tightly connected with the value of the family in Greek society.
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However, religion, which constitutes the third basic element of 
Greek culture, seems also to contribute to the status of the working 
woman and so affect the configuration of the organisational culture.
Religion helps to design the ideal type of "citizen" and "employee". 
Rehgion is in additional, tightly linked with nationalism. Indeed, the 
Greek Orthodox Church played a crucial part in maintaining the Greek 
language and their historical continuity during 400 years of Turkish 
occupation. Therefore, the notion of a "good Christian" seems to be 
interrelated to the notion of "good citizen". (Tsoukalas, 1986).
I could argue that a part of the common passivity of employees in 
the workplace should be attributed to the influence of religion. A central 
principle of religious philosophy is self-sacrifice: i.e. people must "grin 
and bear it" regardless of the situation they are in. Accordingly, 
employees are not encouraged to think about resistance. Employee 
passivity merely reproduces these same conditions which generate 
workers’ dissatisfaction. However, religion can also be considered from 
a positive perspective, as it leads employees to consider their job in a 
meaningful way as contributing to society. Rehgion therefore, is clearly 
related to identity.
As I argued earher religion also seems to underhe the status of the 
sexes in Greek society as a whole and in specific organisations in 
particular. Despite the principle that all people are equal, women seem  
to be burdened with many more obligations toward’s society than men. 
Women must be humble and patient mothers, wives, sisters, whose end
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is a perpetual offering to those surrounding them. The stereotyped roles 
also seem expected within the workplace, (Morgan 1986). Therefore it is 
not surprising for example that women are the most likely people to 
prepare the coffee for their male superiors and their male peers, iPuhlic 
Sector, July-August, 1989).
It is also the religious influence which constitutes the perception 
women who go to work in trousers as less respectable. (It is forbidden, 
by religion, for women to wear trousers, as they are men's clothes). A 
few years ago (in the late seventies) the superior of the service where I 
work refused to allow us to go to work in trousers. Even nowadays, the 
appearance of a pubhc servant in trousers is not commented on 
positively.
However, employees in the G.P.A. do not seem to put any 
emphasis on the influence of religion on the reproduction of their 
organisational culture. Perhaps is the tacit and imphcit nature of 
religion so that it is barely noticed yet all pervasive. Thus, the 
interviewees whom I contacted during the development of this project, 
did not make a clear-cut reference to rehgion as a factor which affects 
the workplace. Even the status of the working-woman in the G.P.A. and 
matters of gender were referred to as clearly social issued unconnected 
with religion.
What appeared to be the main, if not the only, factor which 
contributes to the construction and maintenance of organisational culture 
in the G.P.A. was its strong Politicization, through the formation of
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cliques and informal alliances. This factor will now be discussed further 
alongside other elements which appear to determine the culture of the 
G.P.A. In particular, I will focus on the interpersonal relationships of 
employees in the G.P.A. According to Crozier (1964) these social 
relations of production are potential factors which help to reveal the 
culture.
An examination of these relations in the G.P.A. reveals that in 
addition to the influence of Greek culture upon the workplace, with its 
shared values and assumptions, there are also countervailing 
fragmentary pressures. Cliques and. informal alliances reflect a 
heterogeneity in the culture of the G.P.A. which stands in contradictory 
tension to the broader social culture of shared Greek values. The 
heterogeneity seems to be the consequence of the link of the G.P.A. with 
Politics. It is, furthermore, reinforced by "the regulations of personnel 
management which is concerned with powers, obligations and spheres of 
competencies while neglecting such matters as job content or the 
adequacy of available skills".(Ferrareci in Clegg, Dow and Bareham  
1983, p. 147). One could represent this relation as follows;
Culture.
(^Tio^genizin^
(h ^ rogen eit^
Politics
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V. 3. Interpersonal and intergroup relationships
This section focuses on the interpersonal and intergroup 
relationships of employees within their workplace. It does so in order to 
reveal the cultural traits of the G.P.A, and to examine whether these are 
affected by the social culture and how they are related to the 
bureaucratic process in the G.P.A.
"The common interest gathers people together as long as each one 
lives happily within it". (Aristotles ’Politics' p. 159). However it is not 
only for this reason that people gather together. For Vacalopoulos (1987) 
it is individual interest which drives people to form cliques and groups 
and join political parties while the common interest is ignored.
Both writers refer to Greek culture and society and deal with the 
formation of cliques within this context. It is Vacalopoulos (1983) who 
reveals another reason for the formation of groups or cliques. This 
reason consists in the employees' need for identity through cliques. Of 
course, it is not original to Greeks to seek for identity within groups, that 
seems to be a common feature of many cultures. However, what is 
significant for Greeks is that the cliques and the groups through which 
they identify themselves are primarily based on the communality of 
Political convictions. Therefore, the majority, if not all, of the cliques and 
informal groups which are formed in the G.P.A. are based on the sharing 
of common Political views.
We have already discussed in the second chapter the historical
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elements which explain this tight link with Politics. The same historical 
factors (Political clientelism, patronage) influence the formation of 
cliques. Furthermore, Greeks' tendency to form cliques in the G.P.A. is 
reinforced by the bureaucratic structure. As Dalton (1959) advocates the 
division of labour also encourages employees to form cliques. In the case 
of the G.P.A., because of the bureaucratic structure on the one hand and 
the strong party-politicization on the other hand, employees often feel 
isolated from the decision-making centres. In this sense they try to 
affect decision-making within the organisation through their groups, 
which cut across different categories and hierarchical levels and which 
exercise pressure on the formal organisation.
The Greek phenomenon of cliques in the G.P.A. runs counter to 
Crozier's findings concerning French organisational culture. According 
to his research in French public organisations there are no clans, no 
cliques of any sort and none of them was even known to cut across 
different categories. As he argues this is a consequence of bureaucracy 
and of the formal groups to which individuals belong. Individuals are 
entrenched in their status drawing upon their formal positions as a 
means of personal protection. Therefore informal groups seem to be 
useless in the French case. Furthermore, as Crozier remarks, possible 
separate informal activities are likely to threaten the cohesion of the 
formal groups, while cliques that cut across categories are regarded as 
objectionable, in particular as they foster favouritism.
There is a distinct contract between the views of Crozier and
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Dalton with regard to the formation of cliques. Whereas for Dalton the 
division of labour, and to this extent, bureaucracy, encourages the 
formation of cliques, for Crozier bureaucracy discourages such informal 
grouping. The G.P.A. case seem to confirm Doulton's view because 
employees from cliques either to affect decision-making which formally 
would be impossible, or to protect themselves.
In contrast to Crozier's findings, the formal groups in the G.P.A. 
operate only temporarily and for such a period as it is necessary for 
specific interests to be protected or certain aims to be achieved. The 
formal groups do not provide a particular protection to their members. 
Furthermore they keep their members in a very loose way which allow 
them to join various groups within or outside the organisation. Therefore 
it seems to be natural for the same employee to join different groups or 
cliques. However, this "belongingness" to the different cliques at the 
same time, might generate a great deal of contradictory obligations to the 
employees. Therefore sometimes the interest of a clique contrasts with 
the interest of a certain formal category of employee. Then the 
employees who joins both groups find themselves in a very difficult 
situation, especially when they know that the power of the clique over 
the formal organisation is particularly strong.
Personally, I faced this problem when the clique I supposedly 
belonged to, wanted the members of my formal class (administrative 
class) to provide a certain service. In order to achieve that the clique 
tried to influence the formal leadership. The members of the formal class
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resisted by refusing to do what they were asked because they believed 
that it was not their responsibility to provide this service. Thus I found 
myself in a very difficult situation as by supporting my formal class- 
group, I faced the disapproval of the clique.
Informal groups within the G.P.A. keep their members together 
regardless of their hierarchical level and the official post they hold. They 
operate in the shadow of the formal organisation and their existence 
often remains unknown. Although the majority of employees in the 
G.P.A. join such cliques, they often avoid publicizing their participation 
in them. Employees on the other hand who are not in the cliques are 
aware of their existence while others consider participation in these 
cliques to be inevitable. These points are illustrated by the following 
statements of some employees:
"There are informal groups based on different political 
ideas. There are cliques either open or closed to new 
members which form a climate of acceptance or non- 
acceptance for employees. You are never sure about what 
is happening behind your back" says Athena, a newly 
appointed public servant. "I don't know for sure if there 
are some informal groups, but I can sense them... I can 
smell in the air that there are some unidentified forces 
which affect several situations", confesses Adromache, who 
belongs to the educational staff of the Ministry but holds 
an administrative post.
However, Nestor, from the educational staff of TEI believes that
you must belong to those informal cliques if you want to be 
protected from the actions of oppositions. Otherwise if you 
try to be independent, you will have all cliques against 
you".
All these statements reveal that cliques dominate the G.P.A., The last
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statement additionally reinforces the view we hold that employees in the 
G.P.A. present a high degree of defensiveness.
However, one can define cliques, one can be completely aware of 
their power over the formal organisation unless one is an active member 
of these cliques. From personal experience I know that members of such 
cliques become extremely powerful and play a critical role in the 
operation of the formal organisation. Some cliques are highly developed 
to the point where they specifically shape the way that organisation is 
managed. Indeed, leaders of cliques regardless of their hierarchical rank 
are very oftren approached by the formal leadership of the organisation 
in order to contribute to the solution of certain problems or to influence 
the selection of candidates for certain positions, or support certain 
policies within the organisation.
Informal leaders of cliques very seldom seek to take a formal 
leading post or a formal powerful position. They seem to prefer acting 
behind-the-scenes. Thus, when on one occasion I asked such a person 
why he does not take a managerial position within the organisation, as 
it would be easy for him to achieve that, he replied that the power is in 
governing and controlling behind-the-scenes. This suggests that the 
power in the "informal organisation" must be greater compared with the 
one of formal organisation. Also, informal leaders seem to have less 
responsibilities and are able to avoid the frictions that formal 
relationships cause and employee's resistance that control causes, as we 
showed in the previous chapter.
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Although nobody can be completely aware of what is going on with 
these informal groups, it is clear that these groups not only develop 
solidarity among their members, but also show it to outsiders who reveal 
their Political convictions to the public servants with whom they deal. 
Thus outsiders, in order to have better and quicker service, try to 
approach public servants, who have similar Political convictions with 
them, after they have discovered who shares which political ideas.
Artemis, a clerical public servant highlights the above point:
"If somebody belongs to our clique or supports the same 
pColitical party as we do, we treat him/her in a particular 
way."
What Artemis implies, is that the transactions in the G.P.A. either 
among employees or between employees and clients seem to be subject 
to interpersonal relationships. Her statement also stresses once again 
the lack of impersonality in the bureaucratic procedures in the G.P.A. as 
well as the role of Politics in the configuration of the policy of the 
organisation, (p. cc P).
The power of the clique relies on the exchange of formal and 
informal information. As employees of every hierarchical level and every 
category of the organisation are involved, information for every category 
of the organisation is available to the members of the informal groups.
Also, within informal groups, decisions are taken about problems to be 
solved or situations to be affected in the formal organisation. These 
decisions seem to be proposed from the members of the informal groups, 
through their formal status. Therefore, in this way employees satisfy
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their need to participate in decision-making, something they could not 
achieve through formal procedures.
The intensive tendency of the employees to form groups or cliques
might derive amongst the other reasons we have already identified, from
employees' fear of being isolated within the organisation. There are
cases when employees do not want to be involved in any kind of informal
business but they are afraid of being isolated. This is illustrated by
Athena a clerical public servant :
"I prefer to be with those (groups, colleagues) with any 
consequence rather than to stick to my independence and 
become isolated."
What she highlights is on the one hand the necessity of joining a 
group of colleagues, a clique, and on the other hand the need for social 
hfe in the workplace. This grooup membership/conformity is fiielled by 
the fear of isolation and its accompanying sense of insecrutiy. The need 
for social contact can be exploited by the various political parties. 
Through their "active supporters" political parties try to pass their 
meesage and shape the conditions in the workplace accocrding to their 
will. All the employees answering to my question "what affects them 
mostly in their workplace" remarked that the human environment, 
collaboration with peers and superiors are the most important factors.
Athena and Alcestis, the clerical pubhc servants, highlighted this
point:
"The room I work in doesn't affect me as much as the 
people I work with." points out Athena, while
Alcestis states:
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"It happens for a whole week that you are unable to 
perform and make a lot of mistakes because of several 
problems caused by human relations."
Both statements reveal the importance of the interpersonal relationships,
and point out, especially the second, that the formality of bureaucracy is
not enough to facilitate efficiency. The informal background is more
important emd seems to transform the formal bureaucratic structure.
Yet the conflict in the organisation is highly detrimental for the 
employees' interpersonal relationships, because of the existence of these 
different cliques. Conflict seems rather natural as the different cliques 
defend different interests, aim to achieve different goals and try to serve 
as best they can the political party they support. However, although 
these conflicts take place behind-the-scenes, they reinforce the already 
established climate of apathy in the G.P.A. According to Crozier (1964) 
apathy is a rational response when employees want to evade conflicts and 
to escape dependent relationships. Thus, besides the managerial control 
which leads the Greek public servants to apathy and to psychological 
withdrawal from their job, it is also, the tiredness from the every day 
struggle against visible and invisible Political forces which leads to the 
same result.
From the foregoing analysis it is apparent that employees in the 
G.P.A. are overwhelmed by a feeling of insecurity which leads them to 
develop a kind of defensiveness. The formation and activity of cliques 
reinforces this feeling for employees. The fact that tenure is established 
does not seem to affect particularly the employees interpersonal
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relationships. They take tenure for granted and they develop their 
insecurity even within it. This insecurity has nothing to do with their 
fear of dismissal but has a lot to do with employees identity within the 
workplace. As has been revealed from the previous chapter employees 
need seem to be more abstract nowadays. Therefore the insecurity 
which is a consequence of employees relationships is rather a 
psychological matter, whose roots must be sought in the role of Politics 
as they have emerged from history and social culture.
Interpersonal and intergroup relationships also reveal that 
bureaucracy does not appear to be accommodated in the G.P.A. culture. 
As G. Peter (1978) remarks, for a culture to accept bureaucracy means 
that it accepts the impersonality and universality of the rules. 
Moreover, Greek culture, as has been indicated so far, does not appear 
to have any tendency to comply with these bureaucratic principles. It 
rather seems to use these principles in theory to cover the fact that the 
every day practice is the opposite. To this extent, cliques could be also 
considered as a form of employees' resistance against manipulation by 
the bureaucratic organisational structure of the G.P.A.
Summarizing, the interpersonal and intergroup relationships in 
the G.P.A. reflect the social culture of Greece. Political convictions 
characterize the relationships and become the basis for the formation of 
cliques in the workplace. Analysis of cliques and employees' 
interpersonal relationships reveal employees' insecurity and intensive 
defensiveness on the one hand and rejection of the bureaucratic
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principles from the operation of the G.P.A. on the other hand. 
Therefore, by examining the "determinants” of the organisational culture, 
which according to Crozier are the intergroup and interpersonal 
relationships, our view that Politics play a detrimental role in the 
operation of the G.P.A. is reinforced.
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V.4. C onclusion
One of the key findings of this research is that the culture of the 
society significantly affects the culture of the organisation. But in 
addition the findings in the chapter show that localized workplace 
cultures may be highly fragmentary and heterogeneous despite the 
unifying elements of the wider social culture. Indeed these 
countervailing tendencies may simultaneously characterize the 
organisational culture of the G.P.A.
The workplace in the G.P.A. is dominated by the cliques and 
informal groups which are formed on the basis of the communality of 
employees' political convictions. Although the values of the Greek 
society, that is to say loyalty to the state, to the religion and to the 
family, underlie the employees' behaviour and contribute to the 
configuration of the organisational culture, it is the strong feeling of 
politicization which mainly influences the relationships.
Cliques, therefore, because of their fragmentary nature, enforce 
their own culture in the G.P.A. The activity of these cliques seems to be 
critical for the operation of the formal organisation. Their role is not 
limited to the protection of the interests of their members but it extends 
ftirther other aspects of organisational culture. Therefore, cliques 
contribute to the decision-making in the organisation, either by 
exercising pressure on the responsible officials or by using the formal 
status of their members to implement decisions taken within the cliques.
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Thus, within the G.P.A. the influence of informal groups is 
stronger than that of formal rules and relationships. This organisational 
culture appears not to accommodate the ideal burreaucratic principles.
In addition, the G.P.A. culture reveals that strong politicization is a 
potential factor which distorts the ideal bureaucracy by attacking it on 
those points (impersonality and universality of rules) on which 
bureaucracy bases its superiority as an organisational and controlling 
system
Furthermore this chapter also reveals a tension between the 
harmonizing aspects of culture at the societal level and the fragmentary 
nature of cliques and alliances in the more localized culturre of the 
G.P.A.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this work was to examine the contemporary «operation of the 
G.P.A., drawing on sociological theories of bureaucracy and empirical research in 
the services of the G.P.A. The study also addressed the widely reported 
inefficiency of the G.P.A. The research led to the following key findings:
1. Dysfunctions of bureaucracy are reinforced by *'rouspheti" and 
Political interference in every aspect of practice in the G.P.A.
2. Managerial control is tightly related to the 
employees' identity with the G.P.A.
3. Managerial control leads to inefficiency.
4. Employees resist managerial control through indifference.
5. Employees in the G.P.A. showed a high degree of 
defensiveness, seeking for security, and a fear
of change.
6. There are two sorts of Politics: Politics with
a capital "P" (the policy, politics of government 
or political parties) and politics -  policy with a 
small "p" (the policy of organisation). Big "P" 
often shapes small "p".
7. Cliques shape a fragmentary culture in the G.P.A. 
while revealing the powerful role of the informal 
procedures in the formal operation of the G.P.A.
8. Bureaucracy is negative as far as its suffix 
"cracy " is concerned. This suffix gives to 
bureaucracy the power to be imposed on employees 
and to control them.
According to Weberian theory, bureaucracy is introduced as the
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organisationai-control form which in particular, provides efficiency. 
Bureaucracy has been seen as an instrument or tool of unrivalled 
technical superiority. However, it has been revealed through the 
criticism of bureaucracy that it is ambivalent that bureaucracy 
guarantees efficiency. Furthermore a great emphasis has been put by 
various theorists on the dysfunction of bureaucracy, such as 
dehumanization. Even Weber's latest work showed an intensive 
scepticism as to whether bureaucracy dehumanizes organisations and 
turns employees into little "cogs" in the machine, whose only concern is 
to become bigger cogs. The mechanistic way of functioning implies that 
bureaucracy deprives employees' creativity and desire of taking 
initiatives. It also isolates the majority of employees from decision­
making and therefore, employees' conscious compliance is not achieved.
However, bureaucracy as a control system enforces compliance 
through mechanisms such as punishment and achieves the execution of 
the "order" through power delegated on several hierarchical levels. But 
as the labour process theorists remark the result of control is resistance 
which is expressed in various ways ranking from work stoppage and 
strike to psychological withdrawal from job and resignation.
The analysis of the findings, which were mentioned above, revealed 
that in the G.P.A. the bureaucratic dysfunctions appeared to be enhanced 
because of the existence of strong Political involvement. Politics very
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often shape the policy of the G.P.A. The workplace is chracterizcd by 
employees' tendency to identify themselves through their Political 
allegiance to the various political parties. The roots of this tendency 
were found in Greek history and the social culture which affected 
significantly the development of the G.P.A. As has been analysed in the 
second chapter, after Greece's liberation from the Turkish occupation the 
lack of economic resources in the private sector led the citizens to seek 
work in the G.P.A. This strong demand for work in the G.P.A. became 
the reason for the development of the political clientelism, patronage and 
"rouspheti".
Powerful landowners and politicians offered work in the G.P.A. 
while taking in exchange the votes and the support of the citizens. 
Citizens, on the other hand, through this relationship of exchange 
considered themselves linked with the state authority. Therefore 
"rouspheti" was established as the main, if not the only, means of any 
kind of transaction with the state, while "Political interference in the 
ureaucratic procedures came to be considered a natural and interwoven 
action in the operation of the G.P.A.
Bureaucratic procedures such as selection, employees' allocation, 
promotion are the first places where the Political interference apears and 
establishes the employees' dependence on Politics. Most of the selection 
systems applied in the G.P.A., so far were underlined by the idea "to the
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winners the booty." Selection systems based on merit or, at least, on 
fairness did not last long in the G.P.A., as they go against the political 
dependence of the employees. Thus, for example, the last enacted law 
(1735/1987) concerning employees' selection in the G.P.A. was never 
applied, although recruitment has taken place at an extremely frequent 
pace in the last year. This recruitment was based on clear-cut party- 
political criteria, on "rouspheii" in other words, and aimed to influence 
the electorate in favour of the party in power. Now the new government 
is intended to change this system.
The recruitment based on "rousphetV -  i.e. it is both unfair and 1Iinefficient -  undermines the bureaucratic principle of impersonality; it, 4Ialso, supplies the G.P.A. with inadequate personnel. In this way the |
ground for inefficiency is laid. The personnel, however, is not only |
inadequate but is also overnumerous and unequally allocated to the 41various services in the G.P.A. This is also a consequence of the Political ij
interference in the bureaucratic process. |
■Î
The fact that tenure has been established for public servants since |
1911 does not allow the political mastery to replace the personnel loyal |Ito the previous government with a new one loyal to the government of ;i
ithe day. However, it is easy for the political party in power to add its |
i"friends" to the working force of the G.P.A. As a result the G.P.A. |
appears particularly overcrowded. I
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The excess personnel, however, is not allocated according to the 
needs of the services. Yet, the golden rule which requires the suitable 
person for the right position in order for efficiency to be achieved, is not 
taken into account in the G.P.A. In this sense, political interference 
does not attack only impersonality but runs, also, counter to the career 
development, given that career development depends on the position the 
employee hols.
Promotion and appraisal systems are the other bureaucratic 
functions which have been manipulated by Politics. Many research 
respondents complained that regardless of whether they are managers 
or clerical public servants, the appraisal system is either non-existent or 
is limited to a formal worthless procedure. The official records are 
either neglected altogether or given the same high appraisal for all 
employees, with the exclusion of extremely distinctive cases. Identical 
official reports are unfair to employees but free Political mastery and 
managers to promote the preferred persons, as there is no need to justify 
choosing one among equals!
Promotion to the most senior hierarchical positions is particularly 
vulnerable to political interference. The Political convictions of the 
candidates for these positions play a critical role. However, it is not only 
that promotion to these positions is a politically sensitive procedure, but, 
also, the preservation of these positions is a matter dependent on the
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"Politics", Thus, every governmental change usually entails a kind of 
rearrangement in the various managerial positions. Because of that 
managers especially, but supervisors as well, live in a climate of 
uncertainty. This greatly affects their work performance while it 
contrasts with the bureaucratic idea about "career" in the organisation.
Furthermore, managers and supervisors who operate under this climate 
of uncertainty, appear to be extremely sensitive to the Political pressures, 
a fact which predefines the way that they deal with the function of 
bureaucratic control.
Its insidious nature makes bureaucratic control particularly 
attractive to Politics. By using bureaucracy the Political mastery 
controls the G.P.A. and through that society. However, what is 
neglected by Politics is the fact that control will often generate resistance 
regardless of how insidious the former happens to be. This resistance 
is reinforced by the fact that the employees’ needs are not satisfied, as 
bureaucratic control enforces employees' compliance and does not achieve 
that by concensus. That generates employees' identity crisis. However, 
employees' do not always practice resistance strategies effectively. In 
many ways they seem to be counter-productive because they reproduce 
the very same conditions of bureaucracy and political manipulation which 
they oppose. They also fail to generate the collective opposition on 
which strong resistance could be built.
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The organisational culture of the G.P.A. is, therefore, affected by 
the exercise of bureaucratic control. The social culture, in addition, 
contributes to the configuration of the culture of the G.P.A., a central 
element of which is the widespread preference for informality over 
formality. The formation of cliques and the development of informal 
activities are based on employees’ strong feeling for Politicization. This 
strong tendency towards Politicization constitues a relatively unique trait 
of Greek society and inevitable underlies relationships inthe workplace. 
This is especially the case in the G.P.A. as the foregoing chapters 
illustrate.
Equally, cliques and informal groups provide alternative means for 
establishing identity in conditions where the dignity and significance of 
many employees is constantly being eroded. Yet, the informal activities 
which are developed within the G.P.A. display the unsatisfied needs of 
the employees for participation in decision-making. It, also, shows the 
tendency of employees to undertake functions from which they are 
deprived by the bureaucratic formality. Furthermore, employees try' to 
regain in this way their subjective value as human beings which had 
been minimized by the bureaucratic structure.
So on the basis of the research, what could be done to improve 
efficiency and fairness in the G.P.A.? The findings of this research 
confirm the ambiguity in the value of bureaucracy as a structure -
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control organisational system which provides efficiency. The existence 
of a potential factor such as Politics in the context of Greek culture was 
sufficient to lead to inefficiency, by reinforcing the bureaucratic 
dysfunctions. There is a complex relationship between formal 
bureaucratic ideal and informal "rousphetV practices in the G.P.A. This 
is a relationship in which 'Youspheti" and bureaucracy reinforce each 
other.
To this extent the G.P.A. must be transformed. The basis of this 
transformation must be the elimination of "rouspheti" and the 
humanization of burreaucracy. The elimination of 'Youspheti" requires 
the depoliticization of the G.P.A., a fact which additionally corresponds 
with employees' desires for meritocracy. Although it has been argued 
that neutrality of administration encloses the danger of the development 
of an autonomous dominating class within society, the democratic 
parliamentary structure of the state seems to safeguard it from this 
possible development. The fact that in the top of the administrative 
hierarchy there is a member of parliament (minister) minimizes the 
danger of bureaucracy being an uncontrolled autonomous class. 
However, participation of societal forces in the decision-making of the 
administrative policies would contribute to a further reduction of the 
threat of "bureaucratic domination."
In this sense the G.P.A. must be transformed on a basis of a
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party-political consensus. The political parties must prevent 
interventions of any kind in the administrative process and therefore to 
contribute to a possible degree of neutrality of the G.P.A. That must be 
the first and critical step for the transformation of the G.P.A.
Then, the concern should be shifted to the administrative 
structures. Humanization of bureaucracy draws on a great number of 
issues. All the bureaucratic principles must be reformed under the light 
of the recognition of the invaluable potentiality of the human being. 
Thus, the G.P.A. must be directed towards freeing and activating the 
human resources within it. Employees must be allowed to ’’mature" by 
substantial participation in the administrative process and undertaking 
of responsibilities.
Employees’ participation in the decision-making should be critical 
issue in the reorganisation of the G.P.A. Employees' participation would 
lead to the elimination of resistance and of resentment of employees 
while it would help a climate of cooperation and collaboration to be 
established. It, also, would leave space for the creativity and imagination 
of employees to be developed and would make them willing to undertake 
responsibilities.
The holding of knowledge would be basic element in the 
substantial participation of employees in the administrtive process. 
Knowledge and skills necessary to complete the job, are preconditions for
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an effective workplace. This must be matter of concern in the G.P.A. 
Training courses must be organised not only at the beginning of public 
servants' careers but also throughout the employees' working life. 
Employees must be encouraged to adjust their knowledge and skills to 
the new technology and new methods of work. In this manner, they 
would feel confident in the performance of their work.
The distribution of work which leads to specialization should be 
organised on another basis. All the members of the office must deal 
periodically with all subject of the work. Thus, although for a certain 
time they deal with a certain job, they know how to get on with the job 
of their colleagues. In this way, when everybody in an office knows how 
to deal with all jobs no one obtains any specific power because of 
specialization of expertize.
The hierarchy, on the other hand, which exists only in order to 
preserve authority, to transmit commands and to be used by "Politics", 
should rather be abolished or, at least, find a meaningful reason for being 
sustained. However, it should defhitely not exist to reinforce Political 
control over employees in the G.P.A. and through them over society. If 
there is a point which must be examined deeply that is the reform of 
hierarchical structures of the G.P.A.. However there hierarchical 
structures constitute the sources which maintain the system of control 
and therefore they never appear as a matter in the political parties’
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agenda. Political manipulation relies on them.
To this extent it is ambivalent if the Political forces will contribute 
to a radical debureaucratization while maintaining the sources which 
reproduce the system of control. Therefore, the question will be always 
there: Is there any possibility for Political forces to give up interfering 
in the G.P.A. when the G.P.A. reinforces their power in controlling the 
society?
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